The Silver Fern

I would argue that the biggest area of potential improvement for the ABs, going from the Rugby Championship to the Autumn Internationals, was the defence. While there was plenty of stuff happening in attack, on the defensive side the team gave up plenty of easy scores against their opponents, whether it was through an all-too easily penetrable goal-line defence (South Africa 2), clever set-piece attack from lineout (Australia 1) or complex phase play patterns (Argentina 1).

In Ireland, they had an opponent which could exploit all three areas, so it was a big tick in the box of defence coach Tamati Ellison that the Irish were only limited to 13 points in Dublin. So what changed between the RC and November? Well, it turns out that quite a lot can change in the space of a few months. As an example, I’ve tried to compare the Irish game with the defeat to Argentina in Wellington, as both Ireland and Argentina play with the Leinster blueprint of phase-attack, with Argentina more or less adopting this system after Contepomi has come in. While the defence wasn’t the main reason the ABs lost in Wellington – before the Savea brain explosion in the 68th minute, they were still in an excellent position to win the test – it played a big role in the consistent loss of momentum. In contrast, against Ireland, the defence put consistent pressure on the Irish attack, creating the conditions for McKenzie to kick them to victory in Dublin.

The first thing that stands out when comparing these two games is the AB exit kick strategy. Whereas the ABs kicked long off 9 for their first exit play against Argentina, against Ireland they went with a short contestable kick off 9. Both strategies led to wildly different defensive lines and set-ups at the point where the opposition receivers where able to set up their attack:

In the first example, Perenara doesn’t look for or fails to find touch going long and the Argentine backfield is immediately able to launch an attack against a very fractured and disorganized Kiwi chase. The Argentinean forwards are positioned well as blockers and in the subsequent phases, the AB defenders are consistently on the back foot, with multiple Argentine switches off 10 able to outflank the AB defence, which isn’t effectively numbering up. After another gain-line carry off Carreras, the Argentine first five is able to get an offload away, with the only thing preventing a certain Argentina try being Beauden Barrett blocking the passing lane for the final pass. Throughout this game, the ABs consistently kicked long without a solid idea behind the defensive purpose of their chase, inviting pressure onto themselves and giving plenty of opportunities for the Argentinean phase attack.

Contrast this to the Irish scenario, where the AB defence is perfectly aligned at the start of the Irish phase attack, as a result of the contestable kick. The Irish try several passes out the back which are well read by the AB defenders, which leaves the Irish attack with little space and few numbers, and a mistake by Aki leads to a positive outcome for the All Black defence. When New Zealand did kick long after the restart, off of McKenzie, they presented a coherent defensive chase (a single hard chaser to put pressure on the opposition kick receiver followed by a set defensive line), making sure they go up together rather than at individual speeds as they did in Wellington.

Back in the Wellington test, time and time again, the New Zealand defence found itself badly outnumbered against the Argentine attack, who have the typical Leinster tendency to overload one side of the field so as to overwhelm the defence with carriers, blockers and backdoor options:

In this particular phase of play, Mallia, the fullback, is allowed to make a line-break and a huge amount of metres, simply because the Argentina numbers are able to fix their opposite defenders, creating options for the attack and doubts for the defence.

In contrast, the Irish were very rarely able to fabricate such scenario’s, as the AB defenders were often effectively able to move into the Irish passing lines. A good example can be found around the 18 minute mark, when Tele’a is stripped off the ball in contact by Beirne, who passes out the back. Normally, this presents an ideal counter-attacking opportunity, only Sititi has immediately sprinted off the line as soon as the turnover happened in order to make this option much more difficult:

Another example occurred early in the game after the first Irish set-piece attack, with Tele’a simply moving into the passing space of the Irish attack, not so much with the intent of making an early defensive read as spooking the Irish passers and putting doubts into their mind. Again it worked, as Aki hesitates for a moment before throwing a pass that wasn’t on, leading to a Doris knock-on:

It’s not like the system fundamentally changed between these two tests, as Lienert-Brown also shot up out of the line after turnover ball in the Wellington test for example. The only problem was his execution of the principle. The idea is (1) to get in-between opposition players, and (2) to do this close to where the ball is in order to shut down the movement at its point of origin. Here, Lienert-Brown shoots up (1) into no man’s land instead of getting into the opposition passing space, (2) and, more importantly, far away from the ball:

The result is fairly predictable: the Argentineans can use their afforded time and space in order to exploit the non-existent connection between ALB and his inside defender, producing an easy line-break and eventual try to Cinti. If anyone was going to shoot up in-between the Argentina players, it needed to be Savea or Darry close to the ball, in order to shut down the attack before it could get started. Now, the attack was neither impeded, with the added downside of Lienert-Brown opening the door for the Argentina attack.

While the New Zealand defence is by no means the finished product yet, at the very least there are clear signs that both the coaches are getting better at strategically implementing its principles (through kick strategy) and the players are getting better at putting the system into play (by choosing when and where to shoot up, for example). There are more examples of defensive cohesion in the Ireland test – the solid execution of double tackles, the effective pairing of low tacklers and jackal threats, both signs of good defensive communication – but this is already long enough as it is, so I’ll leave it at that.

The French attack will pose a different sort of threat to the Irish (speedy counter-attack, snipes off 9, overloading the spaces around the ruck with big carriers), so it will be intriguing to see whether Ellison is able to prep his defence accordingly. If he does, important steps will have been taken by this coaching team towards both an improved attack and defence.

When Jason Holland was confirmed as backs coach at the end of 2023, I wasn’t quite as disheartened as many seemingly were on this forum, a feeling especially common amongst Hurricanes fans. While Holland had his considerable limits as head coach and selector at the capital-based franchise, there was one facet in which he and his Hurricanes teams excelled in, and that was set piece-attack. All things considered, that was pretty much the exact reason he was brought in for, as first Leon Macdonald and then Scott Hansen would take care of the broader principles of the attack. When Will Jordan was asked about his try against England ahead of the Dublin test, he was quick to redirect the plaudits to his backs coach for meticulously planning out the strike move: “It was good to connect with Beaudy and he put a great ball back to the inside, so. But the credit must go to Jase Holland who organizes our lineout strikes. [He] spotted an opportunity there and it paid dividends.”

So when France infringed in the 74th minute of Saturday’s Test match, the stage was set for a Hurricane strike move to finish the job. And yet, Scott Barrett went for three rather than a lineout attack, seemingly signalling a distrust in the efficacy of the strike moves. So what exactly has happened? In order to understand this moment a bit better, I’ve taken a look back at the Hurricanes’ set-piece attack under Holland, why it didn’t make an appearance at the end of the game against France and some of its teething issues in Test rugby.

The Hurricane lineout attack
Holland’s lineout attack at the Hurricanes was characterized by its simplicity, its efficacy and its potential for small but successful variations. Its most effective shape was marked by its use of a six-man lineout with a plus one in the boot, who functioned as the in-field passer to a running 9. The core principle of this move was to have multiple runners in motion, organized around an “arrow runner” (not quite sure what to name this, but arrow seemed appropriate) in midfield, with passing options off both shoulders as well as a further one (typically, the first five) out the back.

A good example of both this signature strike move as well as a slight variation to it can be found in the Hurricanes match against the Rebels in Wellington, in Round 14 of Super Rugby Pacific 2022.

Highlight with timestamp

Early in the game, the Canes have a lineout just outside the Rebels 22. They call a six-man lineout formation, set-up to maul, with Kirifi as plus one. O’Reilly throws to Gibson at the front who quickly transfers to Kirifi, who passes to a running TJ Perenara. Perenara throws a cut-out pass to Proctor in the midfield (the arrow runner), with Love running a hard inside cut while Morgan loops around. Proctor throws the backdoor to Morgan after the Rebels’ midfield has bitten in on Love, creating a two-on-one, leaving Julian Savea with only one man to beat.

Vaihu has bitten in on Love, leaving Morgan free to create the overlap

Seven minutes later, the Canes have another lineout, this time just inside the Rebels 22.

The Canes set up in the same formation and you can see how the Rebels midfield defender, Kellaway, identifies this. This time, he aims to shut down the overlap by targeting the out the back option (Morgan). The only problem is that the Hurricanes have gone for one of their slight variations: Perenara holds the ball a fraction longer, Proctor, the arrow runner, drifts to Kellaway’s inside shoulder and when the 9 passes, a gap has already been created through the Rebels’ midfield’s anticipation of the back-door option. They have taken their eyes off the arrow runner as a potential carrier, leaving the latter to simply run through the space and score the try. Simple but effective.

A visibly dejected Kellaway, after being burned again by the strike play

The six+1 lineout strike made regular appearances in the Hurricanes’ highlight reels across the Holland seasons. I’m sure it greatly enhanced Holland’s reputation as a set-piece specialist. It is also understandable how a portfolio like Holland’s would be attractive to someone like Scott Robertson. While Robertson is a firm believer in defence, counter-attack and set-piece pressure, set-piece attack, especially the lineout peel in the opposition 22, was a staple of the Crusaders during Razor’s tenure. It typically acted as a kind of secondary source of scoring income, an added platform for opposition pressure rather than the core game plan. The in-play superiority of the team would set the team up for victory, and the set-piece attack could act as the killer blow. While Hansen is Razor’s trusted companion, Holland seemed to be appointed to be his sword. So why was it so blunt against France?

Lineout attack at the Stade de France
At first, it seemed as if the Hurricane lineout strike would not get to make an appearance in the test match. Instead of the typical six-man lineout set-up, with the +1 in the boot to act as the in-field passer, the ABs went for five-man lineouts, with Roigard at the base to throw the in-field pass to Barrett at first receiver. Rather than set-up for any sort of immediate strike, the goal seemingly was to secure possession and settle into phase-play, with several passages of play after an NZ lineout going to 7+ phases. While these lineout attacks weren’t necessarily unsuccessful – apart from the botched Savea to Ioane transfer in midfield and the breakdown penalty – it ultimately resulted in very little on the scoreboard, New Zealand’s tries coming from good counter-attack on kick return and a forced turnover around the French 22.

It was only in the 52nd minute, after France had just scored two quick tries in succession, that the call came for a six-man lineout, with Lakai in the boot. It was a field position typical for the Hurricane lineout strike, in and around the opposition 22, with the likely goal being to create a scenario where Caleb Clarke is put into space and in a one-on-one situation close to the try line.

The French, however, quickly identified what was coming: Roumat immediately spots the pattern, runs to the middle while calling lifters to him and promptly steals the ball.

Roumat calling lifters to him after seeing what’s about to happen

The ABs would get another shot at it in the 59th minute, after a breakdown penalty won by Savea. With the gap at seven points, this is the perfect moment to pull out a strike with a high-success rate. The lineout set-up is the same, 6+1, only this time the call is to go to the front. Savea secures the ball and transfers quickly to Lakai, who throws the pass to Ratima. The 9 passes long to ALB who acts in this scenario as the arrow runner. In an interesting variation to the play – which catches the French midfield defence off guard – Lienert-Brown quickly passes to Ioane, who, instead of acting as the dummy inside cut, functions as a sort of secondary arrow, with McKenzie on his shoulder and Barrett as a back-door option.

In the standard play, ALB would take up the ball, with Ioane as the dummy runner. Instead, ALB passes to Ioane, creating a secondary arrow.

The variation works, as Ramos is caught in no man’s land, allowing Ioane to put McKenzie into space who still has Jordan on the outside.

Bielle-Biarrey seems fixed but isn’t.

The only thing that saves France is Bielle-Biarrey’s ability to act as two defenders at the same time. First, he is in position to make a tackle-assist on McKenzie but as soon as the latter passes to Jordan, he uses his incredible pace to shut down the space in the corner. Jordan is unable to finish against the French scramble defence and the AB trump card, the Hurricane lineout strike, is successfully foiled.

This is, at least, one good reason why Barrett didn’t go for the corner at the end of the game, as one of the signature strike moves of Holland had been earmarked and recognized by the French defence, both at the lineout (Roumat) and in the scramble (Bielle-Biarrey). If your opposition already knows what is coming, your chances of success drop drastically. Even when the ABs used an unexpected variation to the strike with the secondary arrow, the French defence was still able to adjust quickly.

AB lineout attack in 2024: a mixed bag
Another potential reason for Barrett’s choice is that the NZ set-piece attack has had a season with very mixed results. There were some great tries scored off lineout (SA 1, ENG) and scrum (JP), but other promising movements often fell short through lack of execution. There were also quite a few signs that what worked well in Super Rugby didn’t translate so well to test rugby, including the signature Hurricanes lineout strike.

The second game against the Springboks in Cape Town offers some nice examples of this difficult transition, in my view. After creating a lot of opportunities but just coming up short in Joburg, the ABs, once again, were able to produce plenty of line-breaks off lineout attack in Cape Town. In the 13th minute, for example, the ABs have a lineout near the Springbok 22:

Cane breaks off of his position as plus one and Taylor throws it over the top. After a relatively quick recycle, Sititi makes a powerful midfield carry. The Springbok defence is struggling to keep the pace with the AB attack and in the next phase, Ratima passes to Savea who, targeted by both De Allende and Du Toit, passes back inside to Taylor who makes the line-break, as Wiese is too late in taking up his spot on Pieter-Steph’s inside. While this is a nice lineout strike, at the same time, this is the situation immediately after the line-break:

The Springbok defence is more alert to the break than the ABs. Scott Barrett is watching it all unfold and Sititi is only just getting off the floor. While Tamaiti Williams has nicely anticipated the situation, Ratima is the only realistic option to finish the break. Seeing this, Wiese follows the script from the RWC final (run every single support runner off their line, at whatever cost) and clumsily trips up the AB 9, costing himself a trip to the sinbin.

This simple fact – that Test defences react much, much quicker to breaks than Super Rugby defences – has been the single biggest Achilles heel of the 2024 AB lineout attack, as it has been unable to fully anticipate this fact into its strikes. One final example to show this, and where else to finish than with the Hurricane lineout strike.

In the 56th minute, with the ABs trailing the Springboks 13 points to 9, New Zealand has a lineout within the Springbok 22.

The six-man plus one formation is called and, after Barrett secures the ball at the front, Cane acts as the in-field passer to Perenara at 9. Perenara throws a long pass to the arrow runner, ALB, with Jordan running the dummy cut. Lienert-Brown passes out the back to McKenzie, who has Ioane on his shoulder and Reece out wide. McKenzie passes short to Ioane to bypass Kolbe, allowing Rieko to release Reece towards the corner.

Besides the addition of Ioane – which is necessary because of the throw to the front as well as the presence of the Springbok defensive shooter (Kolbe) – this is a mirror image of the typical Hurricane lineout strike. As a result, we can compare some stills side-by-side (I have taken a Hurricanes lineout strike from their game against the Fijian Drua in 2023:

First, the situation of the arrow runner when he is close to the line.

What is noticeable is how different the space off of the arrow runner’s shoulder is in both situations: whereas in the Canes example Moorby is still a solid option for the pop-pass by Sullivan, forcing the Drua edge defender to turn inside, against the Springboks, Am has beaten Jordan into this space. The Jordan dummy run then has no effect on the Springbok scramble to the outside, as they can fully focus on the backdoor options and collectively push to the outside.

This is the end result of both strikes. Whereas the Fijian Drua defence is comprehensively outflanked by the play, leaving Goosen a simple run-in try, the Springbok defence, on the other hand, has outpaced the AB attack to the corner, leaving Reece face-to-face with four Springbok defenders on their feet. A few aspects have led to this situation: the throw to the front rather than the middle, which means that there is more space to make up; the necessity of McKenzie being a metre further back in order to be able to execute the overlap with Ioane against the Springbok shooting defender (Kolbe); and Jordan being beaten to the space, leaving the scramble defence free to sprint to the outside. These are matters of inches and seconds, but, as it turns out, that is the difference between scoring and getting turned over, between winning and losing.

Returning to the 74th minute in Paris
We will never know what was really going on in Scott Barrett’s head when he pointed to the sticks near the end of the Test match against France. Perhaps he felt they were on the right side of the referee and could eke out a win through Razor’s principles of in-game superiority: defensive intensity, set-piece superiority and dynamic counter-attack phase-play, forcing a penalty in the dying minutes. What we do know, is that he didn’t feel comfortable going to the Hurricane lineout strike as a means of guaranteed points. After being foiled in Cape Town, the French defence had shown itself more than capable of dealing with it as well, both at the lineout and through the scramble, even in the face of clever innovations. If the Hurricane lineout strike is going to return to Test rugby in 2025, Jason Holland will need to find a way of sharpening it, where it can finally cut through South African and French Test defences. If he can, we can expect some of these results to reverse in the next Test season. If he doesn't, Barrett will have to keep going for 3, hoping that this time they can secure an opportunity for the winning kick.

I know there’s a lot of criticism on this forum towards the incessant turn to kicking by Barrett in this game, but, rewatching the game, I’d argue that the kick-option was the right choice a lot of the time, but it was Barrett’s mixed execution of his kicks which led to mixed outcomes. Charlie Morgan of The Telegraph already highlighted this example around the first minute of the game. Barrett, following an over the top lineout win by Savea, receives the pass around the halfway line and puts up a great wipers kick. The kick is regathered by Telea, who offloads to Ioane, leading to a linebreak and the England defence in disarray. Several Abs have realigned to the openside and this is the picture:

Caleb Clarke, who is out of frame here, is the target for the cross kick. Taylor and Savea are on his inside with only George Furbank covering the English backfield (Marcus Smith is all the way on the opposite side, with 14 English players being bunched up within 20 metres from each other).

What saves England is Itoje’s chargedown of Barrett’s kick, with Barrett probably needing to be just a little bit further back in order to avoid the oncoming rush defence.

Something very similar occurred early in the second half, where the kick option was the right call, only for the execution to fall just short. After Sititi rips out the ball and bats the ball back to Barrett around the 10-metre line, the latter passes to Clarke who breaks through the English defensive line. Following (another) great carry from Tuipulotu, Barrett has called for a kick, with multiple runners (Jordan, Jordie Barrett, Ioane, Telea) preparing to rush:

The kick is the best option here, as the defensive line is solidly set, yet only Marcus Smith (outside the frame) is covering the backfield, with Furbank up in the line. Barrett’s choice of kick, however, the grubber, is the wrong one, as there is very little space between the England defenders and they already know that a kick is coming following the body positioning of the Kiwi backs. The right choice, I’d argue, would be the short chip kick into the space between the English defensive line and Marcus Smith, allowing for either one of the All Black backs to regather or pressuring Smith as well as the potential counterruck. Again, Barrett needs to start just a few metres further back, rather than be so close to the line, in order to execute this option.

One of a first five-eights’ most important skills is their ability to orchestrate the space between his own outside backs and the opposition defenders. Taking a few extra steps forward in order to play flat and manipulate the speed of the defensive line against itself, or taking a few back in order to exploit the space behind, the first five’s orchestration of space through his own subtle movement is the key to a successful attack. Barrett has a great array of kicks at his disposal, but what he often still lacks is his feel for the defensive line. A bit more detail around his own positioning, and the ABs’ attack could’ve been a lot more efficient at Twickenham.

@OomPB said in ABs picking overseas players - inevitable?:

The Springboks will pull away .

It’s interesting, I was looking at the profile of the current Springbok overseas players and it’s noticeable how they’re all experienced, senior players. Of the originally selected November touring squad, the 13 overseas players averaged 56 test caps, with an average age of 31.

That’s interesting because when Rassie first started in 2018, the overseas influence was often made up of inexperienced but highly promising players who, more importantly, were playing in some of the best-coached teams in Europe. In the 2018 Rugby Championship, there was Vincent Koch, with only 9 caps and coached by Mark McCall at Saracens, there was Faf de Klerk with 14 caps who was at Sale Sharks where he worked with renowned kicking coach Jon Callard, and a young Cheslin Kolbe was plucked out of high-performing Toulouse to make his Springbok debut.

Fast forward 6 years and where are the overseas Springboks playing? Urayasu D-Rocks, Honda Heat, Shizuoka Blue Revs... You see where I’m going with this. Look at the current top 6 teams in the Top 14: Toulouse, Bordeaux Bègles, La Rochelle, Bayonne, Toulon, and Clermont. At these 6 clubs combined, a total of 6 South Africans can be found (Carlu Sadie and Rohan Janse van Rensburg at UBB; Raymond Rhule and Dillyn Leyds at Stade Rochelais; Pieter Scholtz and Uzair Cassiem at Bayonne). It seems very unlikely that any of them will feature for the Springboks in the future. 6 years ago, these total numbers would be unthinkable. In the 2018/19 Top14 and Pro D2 seasons, across these 6 clubs (Bayonne was in the second division at the time), 16 South African players could be found, more than twice as many. Furthermore, these players were often much younger at the time, like Wiaan Liebenberg (26), Rynhardt Elstadt (27) and the aforementioned Kolbe (23). Of the six South Africans in these teams today, only Carlu Sadie is younger than 30 (27).

The reason for this seems relatively clear. South African players and especially young South African players, just aren’t that attractive a prospect anymore for high-performing European squads, due to their eligibility for their national team. Racing 92 dumped Kolisi after a single season when it became clear that his performances for them and those for the Springboks were of a totally different level. Saracens, their success basically built on South African players, currently have a grand total of 1 South African player, 29-year old Ivan van Zyl. This year’s Champions Cup Final had one South African across the 46 players, 1-cap fringe Springbok Jason Jenkins.

Again, I’m not claiming the coming demise of the Springboks but to me, it also seems quite clear that the market reality of 2018 when the eligibility rules were opened and the market reality of 2024 are markedly different for South African players. Where are the young promising South Africans in Europe who are benefiting from different high-performance environments, like Kolbe and de Klerk did when they left South Africa? Someone like Steven Kitshoff benefited greatly from his two seasons at Bordeaux before returning to South Africa, Esterhuizen became a different player playing alongside Marcus Smith in the all-attack system at Harlequins. The Springboks reaped the rewards (while, to be clear, obviously also doing their own part in the development of these players). There doesn’t seem to be an equivalent available in the coming years.

The introduction of overseas players for the Springboks wasn’t just a money thing, it also reintroduced valuable IP into the team, like Duane Vermeulen and Willie le Roux who had been experienced voices in big European teams. But when the best teams in Europe are seemingly uninterested in getting the best young South African players, where exactly is this IP going to come from? Might be interesting to contemplate those things some more. I’m sure that Rassie is more than aware of it.

So I rewatched the NZ Schools game. It wasn’t pretty viewing, as you’d expect. NZ Schools first three possessions of the game all led to turnovers: Verster throws a miss pass when it wasn’t on, leading to Pahulu going rather meekly into touch; then, Verster, playing under advantage, tries an attacking chip with zero deception (the subsequent attacking lineout is lost because of a baulk); in the third possession, Sinkinson passes out the back to an unexpecting Saumaki who drops the ball. When they finally decide to turn to the kick as everything else isn’t working, Norrie kicks it out on the full after it was passed back inside the 22 by Verster, leading to an attacking Australian lineout. When it rains, it pours. And it didn’t get much better after that, unfortunately. So it was a rough watch.

I thought I’d share some notes, if anyone would be interested in reading them. What stood out to me was the NZ Schools defence, especially its breakdown in communication at certain times, of which I’ll try to give a few examples. This was further compounded by some clever Australian attack, which was able to identify similar weaknesses in both NZ Schools and Barbarian U18 defence, in its earlier game.

The first Australia U18 try would be a good place to start. Gold has a lineout on the NZ 22, a simple throw to Langi in the middle pod leads into a straightforward Lemoto carry (where he pretty much demolishes Sinkinson). After two quick rucks inside the NZ 22, Grover, the Aussie 9, throws a long pass wide and this is the state of the NZ defensive line:

Aussie alignment and Kiwi chaos

Stanley has shot up to make the spot tackle in the hopes of disrupting the Aussie overlap, Guerin has his back turned to the play and Wallis is disconnected from the defensive line. The predictable result: Bassingthwaighte waltzes between Stanley and Wallis to run in pretty much untouched. The basis of this try is the power of the Lemoto carry and the Grover snipes around the ruck but it’s made easy by the lack of communication and connection between the NZ Schools defenders. When you have lone ranger-defenders (Stanley) going alone because the situation is so desperate, then there’s been a bad breakdown in defensive responsibilities.

Another example is the series of events which is probably most indicative of the game as a whole. It displays NZ Schools' lack of patience in attack, their lack of communication in defence and Aussie U18s ability to pounce on these mistakes. The sequence occurs around the 21 minute mark. After 15 minutes of hectic and erratic play, NZ Schools pulls off a great backline move, Norrie getting around his man and nicely putting Stanley through the gap, the passage of play leading to a Verster try. They have a good restart and are working themselves all the way up to the Aussie U18 tryline, only for Spratley to attempt an overambitious placing of the ball (when recycling the ball and setting up the next phase would’ve been the much safer bet), leading to a knock-on and an Australian goal-line dropout. In the subsequent sequence, Spratley has a run-up receiving the drop-out (not making a dent in the defensive line), Sinton throws a low pass to Stanley who drops it. A scrum ensues where the ball is quickly released by the Aussie 9 and for some reason, the NZ Schools scrum keeps pushing even though the ball is already on the other side of the field. This is the situation after the first ruck post- scrum:

I’m pretty sure you can fit the Titanic through this defensive gap. More than enough room for HMS Lemoto.

There is about 15 metres of space between the first and second defenders outside the ruck (Keith and Spratley), which is, understandably, easily exploited by Heinz Lemoto. Again, the foundation is a breakdown in communication. Typically, the 9 shouts ‘break’ when the ball is released, signalling for his loose forwards to detach from the scrum and get into the defensive line. While I can’t pick everything up from the ref mic, Sinton does shout ‘hold’ twice before sprinting off. While Sinton is a very eager and willing defender for a 9, his first responsibility is still to organize and direct his forwards. It would be easy to blame Spratley for his tardiness but what really causes this wide defensive gap is a breakdown in communication between the 9 and his pack.

The irony of these examples is that I really don’t think Australia U18 needed this communicative breakdown to excel. They showed plenty of examples of clever play and identification of opportunities. I’ll limit myself to one example, a try in this game which was a near-exact copy of one in their game against the Barbarian U18s. The sequence starts with a missed kick at goal by Fowler. In the following restart, Lemoto carries Spratley with him for about five metres (there’s a theme here), after which Bassingthwaighte attempts a grubber through which deflects off of Saumaki into the open where it is collected by an Aussie U18 player. Again, an NZ Schools defender, Falloon, shoots up alone without anyone following or a cohesive line behind him:

Ceci n’est pas une ligne défensive.

The resulting linebreak is easy enough and after a number of ineffective phases around the NZ 22, the Aussie U18s set up a short switch play where they slightly fracture the NZ Schools defence. What is interesting about this movement is that Australia U18 ran a very similar set against the NZ Barbarians U18s, where they played a couple of phases in the area around the Barbarian 22 before trying a switch pass against the grain. While the Barbarian U18s read this play much better – leading to Edwin Langi being smashed behind the gainline – the desired result was ultimately the same: the created expectation of a quick pass out of the ruck by the 9 and the added attention to possible switch plays. Then, what Grover was really looking for was the lock 5 as the pillar defender:

Spot the difference. Grover identifies the 5 lock as pillar defender and sneaks through, both sequences leading to tries.

Both Falloon and Frazer Brown, the Barbarian U18 5 lock, were tasked throughout their games with being aggressive defenders, shooting out of the line and putting pressure on the opposition playmakers. I think that Grover is aware of the fact that this responsibility makes their role as pillar defenders more complicated, taking advantage of this responsibility-overload to sneak through around the ruck. This was not so much a breakdown in NZ Schools communication as it was beautifully executed manipulation of the defence.

So, those are some things I noticed and found interesting in the game. I still don’t think this is a bad NZ Schools team though, by any means. Guerin, Pahulu, Stanley and Norrie all seem like supremely talented athletes. Sinton, although he made a lot of mistakes in this game, is still a quality player who will hopefully learn a lot from the experience. Aio Keith always impresses me when I see him play, if only for the sheer levels of shithousery he gets up to. The forwards will bulk up and get their chances. The team as a whole just seemed to be a little underprepared, of which I think the lack of communication is a prime symptom.

If NZ Rugby wants to keep its current team structures intact, it would probably be best to have the NZ Schools team and NZ Barbarians U18s play against each other in a genuine match. I know they played and trained together in camp but a genuine game would have a lot more intensity and would serve as proper preparation for the other games. The upcoming game against the Māori U18 team should be a good contest.

I know this is way too much text and probably not in the spirit of the forum. But what can I say, I like writing and I like reading. Maybe there are others who are the same. Either way, I think I’m going to take a little break now. I’ve spent way too much time on watching these games and writing these posts. Good fun though.

@booboo said in 11. 2024 TOTY LEFT WINGER (THE KARL MARX AWARD):

Please refer rule 6a...

Left wing is an interesting position because I don’t think there has been a very clear stand-out. I’ve tried looking at some of the candidates and pick out some stats.

The World Rugby left wing-selection for their Team of the Year, James Lowe, was good in the Six Nations but had a relatively poor Autumn Nations series (7 turnovers lost and 9 tackles missed across 3 Tests) and a mixed outing against South Africa in July (his touchline blunder in the first Test effectively the difference in that game).

Someone like Louis Bielle-Biarrey, on the other hand, was prominent in the November Internationals but generally lacked impact during the Six Nations (3 starts, 1 appearance from the bench). Against England, for example, he had 1 carry for 7 metres made. Against Scotland, he had 5 carries for 20 metres made, beating just one defender in the process. His only solid attacking contribution came against a very poor Wales side, where he made 9 carries for 84 metres made. Even in the Autumn Nations series, where he was at his best, Bielle-Biarrey still struggled to impose his game against Tier 1 defences. After making 123 metres against another poor defensive side in Japan, Bielle-Biarrey only made 34 and 19 metres in the next two games, against New Zealand and Argentina respectively. While his speed on counter-attack and his defensive nous are genuine weapons at Test level, he hasn’t yet reached the levels on attack of someone like his compatriot, Damian Penaud.

For me, Caleb Clarke has been the most consistent performer this year on the left wing. In 9 Tests (7 wins, 2 losses), Clarke has scored 7 tries, has averaged 9 carries for around 70 metres made, made about 1 line-break per game and beat nearly 4 defenders a game. In a game where defence has been king in recent years, Clarke’s ability to consistently make metres has been an invaluable resource for the ABs’ attacking game, using his power to bend the line or his speed to get behind the defence. One could also argue that some of the poorer NZ offensive performances this season – England 1 & 2, South Africa 2 – coincided with Clarke’s absence, his finishing prowess and ability to beat defenders sorely missed.

Clarke can be perceived as having a less impactful Northern Tour with no tries scored in November, but even then, he still provided plenty of impetus on attack (averaging 9 carries for around 50 metres made, beating more than 3 defenders per game), paired with an added accuracy and involvement on defence (making 16 out of his 18 tackle attempts).

This consistent involvement and ability to make metres against the best defences also makes him stand-out against other big left-wingers, like Scotland’s Duhan van der Merwe, who can make a lot of metres against more chaotic defensive systems (146m against Fiji; 74m against Wales) but struggles much more to impact the game against the top 5 teams in the world. In contrast, Clarke has his averages only drop slightly against top opposition.

Caleb Clarke and Duhan van der Merwe’s attacking averages against France, Ireland and South Africa (3 tests each)

All that being said, Clarke still has plenty of room for further improvement, such as his discipline (0.7 penalties conceded on average and two yellow cards during the season) and his (lack of) variety to his game (an increase in his pass/kick/offload-numbers would make him more difficult to defend against).

But he has shown himself to be an impressively consistent presence on the wing with an ability to beat defenders through power and speed as well as finish attacking opportunities. Add in improved efforts on defence, and one could argue that Clarke was one of the most consistent AB backs of the 2024 Test season. I think he’s more than deserving of a nomination, and would be my personal choice for the left wing.

@nostrildamus Shit, that's never a good sign.

@Frank Nah. Still the best place to talk about rugby, in my opinion. At least you guys know you're full of shit, unlike seemingly everywhere else where this sport comes up.

@Tim said in All Blacks 2025:

We desperately need some rugby.

What, you don't enjoy this particular circle of hell, where we endlessly analyze AB PR photos and make "Michael Manson bench"-jokes?

I think it's pretty neat, as far as eternal suffering goes.

@sparky Charlie Morgan at the Telegraph wrote a good piece on this for the victorious English u20 side, and he rightly points out the importance of the different teams' depth charts as a factor in this sort of discussion.

As there's no loan system in the NZ system, the factor becomes even more crucial.

Andrew Smith, for example, is one of the players in this NZ u20 side you would deem most ready for Super Rugby. He's very physical, strong in the line-out, more than capable as an edge forward, and possesses a big engine. But there a lot of very decent 6/8 options at the Chiefs: Finau, Jacobson, Parker, Boshier and Wrampling-Alec. It'll be difficult for him to immediately surpass these players. But I think he might be a player like Sititi who might have to wait a little bit for an opportunity, but once given a chance can establish himself very quickly.

I also think system suitability is an important factor in a player's progression. The performance of Vernon Bason in both the Rugby Championship as well as the World Cup is a good example of this, I'd say. Bason is a very talented player. He's built like a tank, carries very well and while I can't say this with complete certainty, I think the NZ u20s decent performance in the scrum had a lot to do with him. But I think he struggled at times with the wide role that was asked of him, dropping a lot of ball both on the edge as well as in the middle, as recipient of tip-on passes close to the line. He'll be asked to fulfill a similar role in a Laidlaw-coached Hurricanes side I would assume, which might not be the best use of his particular skillset. (That said, he was phenomenal in this role against the Irish, so grain of salt, etc.)

While I'm certainly not advocating for his move to Cotter's Blues, it's easy to imagine how good someone like Bason would be in the Riccitelli-role. The simplicity of the pick and go would help resolve the issue with the hands, and he's exactly the kind of player you'd want when your pack wants to wrestle the opposition. Again, all of this just to say that different systems would have a strong impact on a player's pathway and development.

During the off-season I spent quite a bit of my time putting together a number of preview pieces for this season’s NZ U20 crop. There’s gifs, there’s graphs, it’s a whole thing. I’ve been hoping to see more in-depth discussion of NZ age grade rugby for a while now but, as it doesn’t seem to be happening, I thought I would help try kickstart something like it here, by writing some stuff myself.

That said, it wasn’t really clear to me where or when I should post these pieces. As there’s been some discussion of someone like Josh Tengblad this past week, I thought it was the right time to post my preview of the potential NZ U20 lock department. These pieces aren’t really traditional preview articles, with an exhaustive list of names and potential line-ups. The idea was more to look at some things that stood out to me and try to spin these things together into something resembling a more cohesive narrative. Again, it’s more intended to generate some interest and to showcase some facets of the play of several players. I’ve written pieces on the hookers, loose forwards, halfbacks, midfield, outside backs and general team performance, and I guess they’ll appear sporadically throughout the following months as the time seems right. But now, it’s about those tall guys in the second row.

Spotlight: Locks with large wingspans and basketball skills
One of the most important factors in the improved performance from the 2023 U20 World Championship to the 2024 edition was the lineout, as it went from a staggeringly low success rate of 72,6% in 2023 to an excellent rate of 91,8% in 2024. Led by the efforts of Liam Jack and Andrew Smith (and aided by the solid contributions of Tai Cribb, Cam Christie and Tom Allen), this much-improved set-piece gave the NZ U20s a much more settled platform to set their attack from, rather than the chaotic shambles of 2023.

It’s an interesting group of potential locks for the NZ U20s in 2025, with an athletic profile which has perhaps not been as prominent in recent years. Players like Josh Tengblad (Highlanders, Otago) and Dylan Eti (Chiefs, Waikato) especially have a unique combination of height, mobility and acceleration, making them a valuable asset both at set-piece and in open play. Add in proper hand-eye coordination as a result of their lineout prowess and dynamic body control capable of an effective offloading game, and you have an athlete which is more typically associated with high-level basketball than rugby.

Eti (Chiefs U18 v. Blues U18) with the step and offload

Tengblad (NZ Schools v. Barbarians U18) with the acceleration and finish

These kinds of athletes have been very successful at Test level in recent years, with players like Thibaud Flament, Cameron Woki, Ollie Chessum, RG Snyman, and Nick Frost presenting a new kind of lock who combines lineout work with an ability to cover a huge amount of ground in defence as well as offer a multipurpose carrying option on attack. These players are often able to effectively defend across the entire defensive line instead of just limiting themselves to the middle of the field, as a result of their swift feet and body control, despite being very tall and lanky. They also offer a handy support option on counter-attack, both as an option to finish as well as a possible offload.

Eti in the background sprinting back for the scramble defence

Tengblad with the lineout steal and support play against Aussie U18s in 2023

At the moment, these locks are still relatively rare across the NZ Super Rugby sides. The standard Kiwi lock (think of any random Crusader lock) is still more understood as a player who excels in his core roles: being a solid lineout option, knowing the intricacies of the attacking and defensive maul, making the occasional carry through the middle, cleaning plenty of rucks, acting as a primary pillar defender, and so on. Tengblad and Eti excel in some of these roles, but certainly not in all.

Someone like Tengblad, for example, is a genuine weapon in the defensive line-out, using his considerable wingspan to disrupt opposition throws, even after being lifted considerably later than his opponent.

Tengblad with such dominance that he makes opposition throws look like his own

His presence can be so destructive that lineout plans have to shift mid-game. In several of the examples shown above, of the 2023 U18 game of the Blues against the Chiefs, Tengblad had picked off three straight throws. When the Chiefs U18 had a lineout near the Blues try-line, they tried to change up their call, going to the front in an attempt to avoid Tengblad. This allowed the Blues U18, however, to use their lineout zone defence, with Frazer Brown, the front jumper with the single lifter, now turning over the ball.

Frazer Brown enters the disruption game

So while the lineout is still a strength of players like Tengblad (and Eti to a lesser degree), other facets of the Kiwi lock’s core roles, such as maul defence and carrying in the tight, are not quite at the level required (yet). Tengblad’s slighter and lanky frame makes him susceptible to turnovers in the tight carry, while Eti’s decision-making in the maul defence – trying to drive through the centre of the Blues maul 5 metres from the try line in an uncoordinated manner – can be questionable.

Tengblad rather meekly knocking the ball on when carrying into contact

Eti's ineffective maul defence, trying to attack the source without any coherent sort of plan

In order to combat these tendencies, it is best to take the locking combo into consideration, where someone like Tengblad is paired with someone who excels in tight carrying and maul defending (his combination with Frazer Brown, for example, for the Blues U18 was nicely balanced in this sense).

Players like Tupou Vaa’i and Fabian Holland, who are tall, athletic, have quick feet and good body control, are still more of an anomaly than the norm in New Zealand, despite the fact that they are quickly showing their value at the international level. But with the likes of Tengblad and Eti coming through (as well as Tevita Tatafu (U18) further down the line), this might be changing pretty soon across the NZ rugby landscape. In the immediate future, they should give the NZ U20s some extra dimensions, both to their attack and defence, through their unique skillsets and physical profiles.

Depth discussion
The other locking options available to the NZ U20s offer plenty as well. Aisake Vakasiuola (Chiefs, Bay of Plenty) is a lock/6 whose strengths are his vision in attack and his ability to offload, who has gotten some game time for Bay of Plenty in last season’s NPC, playing 60 minutes in the final. Vakasiuola is tall but his lineout work isn’t a particularly prominent facet of his game, as others have typically taken this responsibility ahead of him (e.g. NZ Schools; Chiefs U18 and U20; Bay of Plenty).

Another potential option is Frazer Brown (Blues, Auckland), who is still U19 in 2025 but who is another big specimen. Brown isn’t quite as mobile as the other locks (although he is certainly fast enough in a straight line) but he packs a real punch in the tackle and the carry, showing a willingness to make repeated hard carries through the middle and add his grunt to the forward efforts. Jake Frost (Crusaders, Canterbury) is another under-ager who is rated highly, already making the Crusaders U20 squad in 2024 as an 18-year old. Someone like Alex Arnold (U19) also offers up an interesting profile. A lock/6 from Hamilton Boys’ and a Māori U18 representative, Arnold is a bruising presence around the field, with good physicality in the tackle, carry, and clean.

@nostrildamus That's tough to gauge. Munster played well but you can't say they presented test-level opposition.

From the uncapped guys, I'd probably say Fabian Holland and AJ Lam. Holland is a great athlete who stepped up the intensity of his play and Lam showed some nice subtle touches to go along with great physicality in the midfield.

I'll give @Bovidae a shout. With Stargazer no longer here this year, he has put a lot of effort in, especially on topics such as school, U20 and sevens rugby.

@OomPB said in ABs picking overseas players - inevitable?:

We have been through this many times.

Lord, protect me from these devious South African rugby prophets and the false gospel of Surf Jesus. Let us be like the humble beaver, in his willingness to sacrifice everything for that which is most holy, the Black Jersey.
[Ms. Ludwig XV 3 (83.MR.173), fol. 83. A Hunter and a Beaver, about 1270, Unknown artist/maker]

Fun fact, beavers were genuinely seen as the representation of the “willingness to sacrifice anything that hinders the ability to devote oneself to Christ” in medieval Christian symbolism. So in the picture above, for example, the beaver bites off his own testicles (!) in order to get away from the hunter, with beaver testicles being seen as having medicinal value. I’m sure there’s a great joke in there, somewhere.

Apologies for the strange intervention, I saw some weird eschatological undertones in the post above and decided to run with it.

@OomPB Do I have a historical fact for you!

“Ian Scott Smith (31 October 1903 – 18 September 1972) was a rugby union wing who played 32 Tests for Scotland and two Tests for the British Isles. Born in Melbourne, Australia, and brought up in New Zealand, Smith moved to England and was educated at Winchester College, before studying at Oxford University and later Edinburgh University. At Oxford he took up rugby and was eventually selected for Scotland, for whom he was eligible because of his Scottish parents.

[...]

In 1933, Smith captained Scotland for the Home Nations Championship.”

From Tony Collins’ A Social History of English Rugby Union (2009), p. 164:

“As the rugby correspondent of the Athletic News pointed out just before the First World War, there were no formal guidelines for national selection: ‘sentiment enters the process of qualification to a very great extent and if the stranger from afar has a reasonable sort of association with the land wherein he is domiciled he may, if he possesses no previous national distinction, be picked for that very land of temporary residence’. [...]

[T]he IB refused to ‘take any steps towards defining international qualifications’ but suggested cryptically that if a player took part in a trial match for a national side, that fact should be ‘worthy of the sporting considerations of several unions’, thus avoiding taking any position whatsoever. The immediate beneficiaries of the IB’s fence-sitting were the Scots, who won a Grand Slam in 1925 with a three-quarter line that included Melbourne-born and New Zealand-educated Ian Smith, 1921 All Black captain George Aitken and A.C. ‘Johnny’ Wallace, who was to captain the New South Wales tour of the UK in 1927.”

Sorry to intervene, I just thought it was interesting how much present-day Scotland rugby mirrors the team from a century ago.

@Frank said in Springboks 2024:

Which players in the current squad that are to retire before the next WC will be replaced by someone realistically likely to be better?

With the current Springbok team, I’ve found it difficult to predict the playing level of uncapped players, as the coaching team seems to get a lot out of them. Who would’ve said Nche would eventually be the best loosehead prop in the world before he became a regular part of the Springbok team in 2021 as a 26 year old? Who would’ve guessed De Allende would be the most complete 12 since Nonu, if you saw him play in 2017? Where did Am come from, all of a sudden, in 2018 and ’19? This was a guy who was playing for the Southern Kings when he was 23 years old. The next year, he’s a Springbok. The year after that, one of the best centres in the game. It’s the same with Mapimpi, Mbonambi, Arendse, Kwagga, and so on.

The problem – if you’re an ABs fan, not a Springbok fan, obviously – is that the current Springbok coaching team have produced a team culture which gets the most out of a lot of the players. So it doesn’t really matter whether the next generation is more or less talented than this one. Erasmus seems to be able to get them at the level necessary to win games, which is what truly matters. Players like Cameron Hanekom and Ruan Venter are very talented rugby players but they won’t become regular Springboks unless they can perform the way Rassie wants them to perform (someone like Evan Roos is a good example of someone who has found it difficult to strike this balance despite being a real talent).

It's a very strong and effective team environment, which makes up for any potential issues in depth. Fassi isn’t as good of a playmaker as Willie Le Roux. But he has found other ways of contributing and other players have picked up some playmaking responsibilities, which is able to mask any frailties that were there. It works very well. It’s also very annoying when you don’t particularly like someone like Erasmus. You have to give him credit. But also, I really don't want to.

@kpkanz said in All Blacks Vs England, Twickenham:

I would rather not get to the point we need 10% kicks to go our way to score.

A big reason we were dominant for SO long is our attack was SO effective and at the same time EXTREMELY repeatable.

Draw and pass, offload when it's clearly on, square the defender etc etc.

I think with the popularity of league-style defences for the past ten years, the kicking game has become more and more of a necessity. Look at the top halves in the NRL: Cleary, Luai, Munster, Hughes aren’t just great distributors who can create mismatches and put players through the gap, they’re very accurate kickers as well, with a vast range of kicks at their disposal. Without the kick, it would be incredibly hard to score a try in league.

As props, hookers and locks become more mobile in rugby as well, it’ll become harder and harder to break the line through simple mismatches. Even the Will Jordan try (where the missed tackle by Genge, the England loosehead prop, caused the linebreak) was the result of elaborate deception, where the All Blacks had set up two 'fake' pods as if to continue on the openside only for Barrett to make a late switch to the blind in order to isolate Genge. Nothing about that is just draw and pass, that is a complex strike move from lineout across 3 phases, just so they could get past a loosehead prop who is a very good defender in his own right.

@Bones said in All Blacks 2025:

The other is time travelling Kieran Read.

I thought he looked familiar!

With the upcoming Sevens tournament in Vancouver providing rugby fans another opportunity to watch Oli Mathis in glorious action, I thought it might be interesting to take a look at his evolution as a player in recent seasons and reflect on whether he would be best suited to a place on the wing or to a spot among the forwards for the U20s.

Spotlight: Rugby riddles in the dark
I’m guessing we’re going to be having this discussion for the next decade or something, so I might as well get in early: where, exactly, do you play Oli Mathis? There is little doubt in my mind that Mathis is a generational-kind of player. What stands out in particular in this regard is the sheer range of his attacking weapons. Mathis can beat defenders in a number of ways, be it his raw pace, his fend, his offloading ability, through chips, through steps, swerves, spins and hesitation moves. His highlight reel, for such a young player, is bordering on the obscene.

A very small sample of Mathis' highlight reel

But the question remains, of course, whether this attacking skillset is what you want from your openside flanker. A player like Ardie Savea quickly comes to mind: outrageously talented, without a doubt, but questions around the number on his back have never gone away. Then again, it’s not particularly clear how an openside flanker circa 2025 should be understood either, with a plethora of player-types filling the jersey across the Test landscape.

What makes a flanker a flanker?
To understand what makes a great 7, we can turn to some of the luminaries who have defined the position in the 21st century. Back in 2008, the IRB media program ‘Total Rugby’ wanted to give further insight into some of the more technical facets of the different positions in rugby and what precisely defined them. For the position of openside, they interviewed players such as Richie McCaw, Neil Back, Josh Kronfeld and Richard Hill, asking them what exactly makes a good 7 and what constitutes some of its key strengths and responsibilities. The full article is archived here:

While the position of openside has undoubtedly changed greatly since 2008 – with the fetcher-role especially becoming a collective task rather than just the primary job of the 7 – what these legends of the game answered back then still strongly resonates with modern day Test Rugby.

First, let’s listen to what the open side master himself, King Richie, has to say. “My main role as a flanker is, defensively, to tie in with the back line to ensure that the defence works well. On attack I think my primary role at first phase is to look after our ball. You attack the back line and I'm usually the first person there to make sure we secure that ball. Thirdly I put pressure on break downs and make sure I disturb their ball and try to turn their ball over.”

McCaw presents the classic picture of the openside: the 7 (a) acts as a connector between forwards and backs, (b) secures ball on attack, and (c) disrupts the opposition breakdown. Conventional stuff. But when pushed a little bit further on the nuances of the position, McCaw becomes somewhat more philosophical and wades into the spiritual domain of the so-called intangibles: “The one skill that I think has helped me over the years, and I think it’s quite important for an open side flanker, is anticipating a little bit what’s going to happen, where are breakdowns are going to end up. Actually anticipating when there’s often a shorter way to go, because even if you’re quick and you’re fit if you’re running further than you need to and your opposite man goes on the other side he’s going to be there. So I think understanding where other players are going to end up is one of the important skills.”

What McCaw is referring to here is something akin to game sense: the ability to see play unfold before it’s actually happened. How is that player going to fall into the tackle? What angle of entry is that forming ruck going to allow? When and where is the opposition line going to break?

Richard Hill, the World Cup-winning English flanker, gave a very similar insight: “An ability to realise when someone's tackled, whether to go in with your hands, whether you wait for the tackle to take place or for all parties involved to fall to the floor and then see if you can step over. Or sometimes knowing that if someone’s made a tackle, you actually back away.”

A supreme flanker, in other words, is as much an athletic specimen (Neil Back: “I think you’ve got to be a destructive tackler”; McCaw: “I think the big part outside of the actual rugby is the conditioning side and fitness. I put a lot of work into being fit, it’s a big part of my game”) as a rugby savant, constantly analysing the state of play on attack and defence. Josh Kronfeld, in his typically eloquent style, summed it up as follows: “You want to be able to be doing stuff, grovelling on the ground as well as doing the airy fairy stuff upright with the ball in hand so you have to be pretty well rounded in terms of your rugby skills.” The article finished with some advice from McCaw for any young kid who wanted to follow in his footsteps: “[T]hat’s what I tell to younger kids: try to be as close to the ball as often as possible.”

The fascinating world of ruck involvements
Oli Mathis would’ve been around three years old at the time of these interviews, undoubtedly already a rugby ball in his hands running around the family farm in Waihi. But how well has he actually listened to the greats of the game in the development of his flanker play? That’s what we’re going to try and find out here.

Mathis obviously scores well on a number of these facets, such as conditioning, handling skills, support play and attacking vision. He often sees a line-break happen before it has actually occurred and is more often than not in a good position to further link the play. He will accelerate into the gap anticipating the offload, and he will try to find shortcuts in attacking support. Other aspects, however, such as destructive tackling or ball-securement, are things which are much harder to bring into view, with Mathis’ proficiency at these roles still requiring a closer look. How well and how often does Mathis shift bodies at the breakdown? How close to the ball does he actually play?

Stats on ruck involvements are a way of getting closer to an answer to these questions. It allows us to get an insight into what kind of openside profile a player has. Does he play close to the source of the ball (high number of ruck attendances)? Does he act more like a cleaner on attack or as a disrupter of opposition ball (attacking versus defensive ruck attendance numbers)? Does he play close to the edges of the law or is he more someone who functions as a glue guy alongside other cleaners (high numbers in positive/negative impact versus high numbers in neutral impact)?

Ruck involvement statistics, in other words, are valuable tools for a deeper insight. But they are not perfect. They contain a considerable subjective factor (what constitutes a positive impact at the ruck?) and they aren’t easy to find or record. Still, I’ve tried to gather some data on Mathis’ ruck involvements across the three 2023 NZ Schools’ games (v. Barbarians U18; v. Australia U18 1; v. Australia U18 2), classifying these involvements into different categories: breakdown attendance (attacking and defensive), positive, neutral and negative impacts, and breakdown steals.

But what exactly constitutes positive, neutral or negative impacts in my view? Neutral impact is simple: the ruck attendance didn’t make a material difference, either in a good or bad way. A positive impact, on other hand, means that the ruck attendance had a clear effect to the good, e.g. a clean preventing a clear turnover opportunity, a breakdown penalty won at the defensive ruck, an effective clean allowing for lightning-quick ball, opposition ball has been slowed down, etc. A negative impact, finally, has left the team in a worse place than before: the ball has been turned over, a penalty has been given away, the own attacking ball has been effectively slowed down by the opposition.

To get an idea what we’re looking for, we can turn to this chart made by Nick Bishop for RugbyPass, on the statistical breakdown of different Super Rugby Pacific opensides.

Source: Nick Bishop, “How the line between forwards and backs is becoming a blur”, 20 May 2024, https://www.rugbypass.com/plus/how-the-line-between-forwards-and-backs-is-becoming-a-blur/

On the basis of this chart, Bishop could show how someone like McReight had added an attacking carrying game to his breakdown specialty, presenting a profile relatively unique in the competition. It’s a way of bringing into view an openside’s ability to combine the many roles the like of McCaw, Back, Hill and Kronfeld have outlined.

Some numbers
Here, I’ll compare some of Mathis’ numbers against other sevens of a similar age profile and against similar opposition, Micah Fale (v. Australia U18 ’24) and Johnny Lee (v. Australia U20 ’24).

So first, let’s take a look at what some of the raw numbers, albeit of very limited sample size, indicate.

These limited stats do paint a picture of three very different opensides, one playing far away from the source with limited ruck involvements (Mathis), one who plays very close to it with a focus on securing ball (Lee), and one who represents a mix of the two (Fale). While someone like Mathis appears to be very selective in the rucks that he chooses to attend, someone like Lee, on the other hand, can be described as a workhorse in that area, constantly following the ball around the field rather than letting the ball come to him.

A flanker or a winger-in-disguise?
If we turn away from the numbers and actually look at Mathis’ game more closely, the stats do seem to reflect certain playing tendencies. Mathis’ first instinct is, first and foremost, to stay alive for any possible attacking opportunity. This has obvious advantages, as it allows his speed, strength in contact and offloading ability to be utilized to the utmost when an opportunity arises. It also has downsides, though, especially when the opposition is targeting the breakdown and slowing down attacking ball.

In the game against the Barbarian U18s, for example, with a 5-metre attacking scrum close to the Barbarian try-line, Mathis’ first job as the openside should be to clear the ruck on his side of the field as efficiently and quickly as possible, so Pledger, the 9, can create width as swiftly as possible in order to overwhelm the defence with superior numbers. Instead, Mathis stays on his feet waiting for the potential offload, allowing the opposition to slow down the ball and reorganize on defence.

Instead of aggressively clearing, Mathis is passive

Mathis’ decision-making around the breakdown, at least in these particular games, was too much focused around staying on his feet, leading to both a lack of physical impact on attack when clearing the ruck as well as presenting the opposition with opportunities on defence, his hesitation to contest the breakdown allowing the Barbarian U18s quick ball and line-breaks.

Questionable decision-making around the breakdown

Josh Kronfeld’s wise words come to mind here: it’s not enough as a flanker to just be doing the “airy fairy stuff upright with ball in hand”. “Grovelling on the ground”, messing up opposition ball by flying into the ruck, sticking hands into places they shouldn’t be, and rolling into the wrong but right place, are as much part of the job of being a flanker as is making the spectacular carries through opposition defences.

Turning it around
Alright, so much for the worrying signs. The attentive reader might now speculate that I’m making a case for Mathis to being turned into a back, where he can prioritize being an offensive dynamo while allowing the tight, groundwork stuff to the less-flashy forwards. And, to be honest, if you’d asked me this question in December 2023, I might have agreed with you.

But this is the thing with Oli Mathis which might be the quality which truly makes him special. He does have great instincts and, more importantly, he shows constant signs of being able to evolve his game. First, his instincts. While his radar wasn’t always working perfectly in the NZ Schools games, there were signs that, if he shifted his focus to the breakdown, he could make a strong and immediate impact.

Clean steal by Mathis

The further evolution to his game became apparent in the 2024 Bunnings NPC season, where, in his games at 7 for Waikato, he showed signs of being able to combine the airy fairy stuff with getting stuck into the breakdown as well. Take a look at his ruck involvement numbers, for example, in his game against Bay of Plenty.

From an average of only 13 ruck involvements as the NZ Schools openside, Mathis’ numbers have shot up to 28 involvements, focusing much more on both securing the ball as well as attacking the opposition breakdown. While he showed hesitation to go off his feet in the NZ Schools games, for Waikato, Mathis was flying into the ruck to clear out bodies.

Aggressive and effective cleans by Mathis

This is an openside with a clearly different focus, making sure that opposition threats around the breakdown are first dealt with, before looking for any potential carrying opportunities. Throughout the NPC season, Mathis showed an increased emphasis on physicality, often combined with excellent technique in the tackle, for example. At times, he could still struggle to effectively shift bigger bodies.

Mathis loses the physical battle at the breakdown

But that is only to be expected of a young, not yet fully physically matured player. What is important, is that he has shown a more complete array of flanker-skills with increased ruck involvements while still retaining his freakish attacking abilities around the field.

Finding the best of both worlds
The goal for Mathis, ultimately, will be to find a balance, one where he still carries out his responsibilities as an openside but where he is able to pinpoint opportunities to drift away from the breakdown in order to sniff out attacking opportunities. This will ultimately come down to his own development as a rugby player and decision-maker, the so-called vision and instincts expounded by the likes of Kronfeld and McCaw. Even for rugby royalty like McCaw, this was something that needed to be learned and developed: “As a young player I used to always chase the ball or be as close to the ball as often as possible to be effective and I perhaps have refined this a little bit now. But if you have those sorts of instincts, then you are going to be able to work out where you are effective and where you’re not.” Mathis’ first instincts are probably diametrically opposed to those of McCaw, with the former too quickly straying away from the breakdown action rather than stick too closely to the ball like the latter. But he too can refine his own instincts and find the road to the best of both worlds. The 2025 U20 season should present Mathis with an excellent opportunity to further hone these instincts in the 15-man game, combining with his fellow loose forwards to dominate both in the tight and the loose.

Potential combinations
Speaking of other loose forwards, there are plenty of candidates who will be competing for starting and extended squad positions. Mathis’ teammate at the NZ Sevens, Joey Taumateine, will most likely be vying for the number eight shirt alongside 2024 NZ U20 representative, Mosese Bason. Rupeni Raviyawa, the Fijian number eight from Feilding High School, could be an interesting option as well, although he might not be eligible for the U20 side.

Micah Fale, still U19 in 2025, will do his best to unseat Mathis from the openside position. Looking closely at his 2024 NZ Barbarians U18 game against Australia, one focus for Fale will be fitness and conditioning. In that game, he started out like a rocket, carrying, tackling and cleaning rucks like a madman. But it became quickly clear that it was a tempo that he couldn’t hold up for an entire game, his engine already running low near the end of the first half. In the second half, he became much more passive, drifting to the edges and waiting for the play to come to him rather than attack it, like he did at first. One reason for this will be the weight he added on in the previous year. If he can keep up his first-half pace through improved fitness, he will be a real asset at U20 level, either starting or on the bench.

The blindside flank has plenty of potential suitors as well. Fabian Holland’s younger brother, Quinten, might feature, his lineout ability and cleaning prowess a complementary skillset to Mathis’ dynamism in the loose. Others, like Finn McLeod and Lenz Morunga-Itunu, have shown plenty of promise as well, both McLeod and Morunga-Itunu having already displayed real attacking prowess on the edge combined with solid breakdown work.

@cgrant While I'm sure it played a role, I don't think this French side had that much professional experience, apart from the spine as you say. I'm rewatching the game and it just seems the NZ players were surprised by the intensity of the French at the start of the match. It was very disappointing to see the main problem of last year - under-resourcing the breakdown - return. The game management and (lack of) kicking by Simpson certainly didn't help either. Pledger is amazing, though.

I usually don't like to comment but I found this result to be very frustrating and I don't think it really has anything to do with professional experience. Playing for territory and creating an intense defensive line is a mark of knock-out rugby, at all levels of the game.