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    AB Blindside - past, present & future
  • MaussM Mauss

    @Bones said in All Blacks 2025:

    @Mauss get Howden to call the lineouts...

    I’ll respond to this here since Howden is yet another in a long list of blindside flankers with Test potential. The thing I’d like to see from Howden, at both NPC and Super level, is greater consistency.

    I really liked what I saw from Howden in the Hurricanes’ game against the Reds during Super Round last year, and since then, I’ve kept a closer eye on him, both for the Turbos and for the Highlanders. What stood out to me throughout these games, however, was the sheer degree of variation of his involvements on a game-to-game basis. This table below, for example, lists Howden’s carry, metre, tackle, lineout and beaten defender count, in every game that he’s started this SR season in the Highlanders’ 6-jersey.

    5ff07973-1774-4b61-95a0-66f5659bafaa-image.png

    Again, what is noticeable is the sheer range of numbers between individual games: between 3 and 14 carries, between 7 to 54 metres made, between 4 and 23 tackles in a game, and between 0 to 3 defenders beaten. The only thing which has been consistent is his lineout contribution, only ranging between 2 to 4 takes.

    a056a6ee-c3a6-4e2f-baf1-99bb2f9eeeb5-image.png
    Howden's carries, tackles, lineouts won and defenders beaten per game

    This graph further highlights how Howden started his games at blindside flank as a volume defender, making 19 and 23 tackles against the Hurricanes and Brumbies in rounds 5 and 7 respectively. His carry numbers were quite low, however, which he tried to adjust and was able to bring up to 14 against the Crusaders in round 11. This game probably presents his 'target' statistical contribution, with 14 carries, 28 metres made, 17 tackles and a defender beaten.

    But this increased carry game impacted his defensive contribution as the season wore on, with his tackle numbers getting quite low, despite the Highlanders putting on massive defensive showings against both the Hurricanes and Crusaders in rounds 14 and 15. Howden only put in 6 and 4 tackles in these games (missing 4 tackles against the Hurricanes as well), which isn’t really where you want your flanker to be.

    So I think Howden is a player of real promise: he has size, is solid in the lineout, he’s defensively robust (usually), and is athletically gifted. But what he needs to try is provide consistency, preferably in the manner that he did against the Crusaders in round 11 (although that is a high bar to consistently reach). Once again, the key is to be able to find the right balance between contributions in the tight and the loose, between attack and defence.

    If he is eventually able do this, he will be difficult to ignore for the selectors.


  • All Blacks 2025
  • MaussM Mauss

    @ACT-Crusader said in All Blacks 2025:

    I think the coaches will keep the faith with Vaa’i but I would really like to see Barrett and Holland get a couple of starts together.

    Who would be your lineout caller in a Barrett-Holland combination? As far as I'm aware, Dunshea is the regular caller at the Highlanders and Barrett really struggled with his calls early in the 2024 Test season. The lineout against England was, at times, comical and Barrett even had the benefit of his long-term hooker Taylor throwing. It would make me nervous to see him restored as the caller.

    The AB lineout only improved in my eyes when Vaa'i became the primary caller. It's what's made him such an integral part of the team during the second half of the 2024 Test season.

    (I'm aware that Vaa'i is the Chiefs caller and that they've struggled this season. To me, it indicates that Vaa'i is good at Test preparation but struggles more with the spontaneous, week-to-week prep of Super Rugby. At least, that's my hypothesis.)


  • AB Blindside - past, present & future
  • MaussM Mauss

    @brodean said in AB Blindside - past, present & future:

    The thing is Razor played him at lock and apart from maybe 1 or 2 games never seemed to entertain the idea of playing him at blindside. Instead Razor has gone for much smaller, lighter guys who are jack of all trades type guys - at 6. I think the biggest guy he's played at 6 for the Crusaders was probably Cullen Grace? So I'd be surprised if Razor ends up going with a bigger style blindside.

    Of course, all of this is just hypothetical. And you make a good point about Razor's previous selection tendencies.

    For what it's worth - I don't think coaching selection is ever set in stone, but let's set that aside for now - Razor did select bigger blindsides once, as head coach of the NZ U20s in 2015 and '16. He picked guys like Mitchell Dunshea (SR lock), James Blackwell (SR lock), and Fin Hoeata (NPC lock) at blindside for certain games during those tournaments, so I guess there's some precedent. Not a lot, though.

    But we'll see what they'll do soon enough. Let's just say, I won't be particularly shocked if he picks Blackadder as his blindside against France.


  • AB Blindside - past, present & future
  • MaussM Mauss

    So I was rewatching the Chiefs-Blues game and Beehre had an impressive cameo. Not just the massive try at the death but his carrying and cleaning was really good as well. He has nimble feet and seems, to me, to be really mobile around the field.

    Beehre showing nice footwork at the line before going more direct for his score at the end

    Looking at his season’s stats before the Chiefs game – 9.7 carries/80, 18 attacking rucks/80 at 82.5%, 16 tackles/80 at 95%, 5.7 defensive rucks hit/80 (Opta); 178 post-contact metres, 11 defenders beaten, 3 line-breaks, 2 tries across the season (RugbyPass) – he seems to get through a decent amount of work in an effective manner.

    He also seems to have a bit of a niggly edge about him and thrives in the close quarters. So a bit of an enforcer with a solid lineout game, dynamic mobility and a high volume of defensive involvements.

    Perhaps this is a bit of a strange one but: Beehre as a bolter for the blindside position?

    I think it could work at Test level (I’d keep him at lock for Super Rugby). If the selectors do go in the direction of a bigger body at blindside, I think he could be an intriguing option.


  • AB Blindside - past, present & future
  • MaussM Mauss

    @zedsdeadbaby said in AB Blindside - past, present & future:

    NZ Rugby currently having trouble finding big bodies - we don’t produce big bodies as a nation naturally and a lot are going to basketball.

    It's something that's really noticeable at age grade level as well, for example when playing Australia. They seemingly have this endless pipeline of tall, athletic players in both the backs and forwards, despite the presence of basketball and AFL.

    It makes it extra tough when players like Akira Ieremia - a big body with good coordination - leave early to places like Japan.


  • AB Blindside - past, present & future
  • MaussM Mauss

    @gt12 said in AB Blindside - past, present & future:

    Finau doesn’t have a place in this discussion after today’s game.

    He’s got the size and tools but isn’t ready.

    At his age, he shouldn’t be coming to it, so maybe next year.

    The issue, I feel, was Parker coming off. It forced Finau into the middle and he's just not a great decision maker in that space at the moment. He struggles playing in close connection with his fellow forwards.


  • AB Blindside - past, present & future
  • MaussM Mauss

    I thought Blackadder played really well last night, against more than decent opposition. But looking at his game - close to source, lots of involvements, tackling around the waist rather than up high - I'm always wondering whether his game isn't best suited to 7.

    But then you have another issue, which is that he isn't particularly fast or dynamic around the ruck. Now Sam Cane was pretty similar, especially in his later years, but we also saw that he was actively targeted in this sense last season, with attackers running strike moves to isolate and pass him by. So it would probably be the same for Blackadder.

    To me, there's growing clarity around the loose forward roles in Super Rugby and this, I think, should translate to AB selection. You have opensides who are very mobile, excel at the breakdown and who have an active but loose role on attack as a carry and link player (Savea, Kirifi, Lasaqa). Then you have number 8s who are high-volume carriers and are able to physically impose their carry game through the middle of the field (Sititi, Lakai, Sotutu and Lio-Willie).

    That just leaves blindside, which is probably still the most varied position amongst the NZ SR sides. Players like Finau, Parker, Flanders, Shields, Iose, Choat, Segner, Howden, Withy, Grace, and Blackadder have all played there, which is a mix of mostly opensides and number 8s.

    I think the AB selection this year should really try to cement their vision on what they want from a blindside, with openside and number 8 becoming relatively straightforward, in my view. It’s a chance to bed in the loose forward-selection for the next few seasons, at least, which should really help the team.


  • Quarterish Final Prediction thread
  • MaussM Mauss

    @cgrant said in Quarterish Final Prediction thread:

    Hurricanes will have to face 27 men

    Ah, the ol' Calcio storico fiorentino-rules, interesting.

    Calcio storico fiorentino - Wikipedia

    Calcio storico fiorentino - Wikipedia

    The game starts when the pallaio throws and kicks the ball toward the center line, then at the first whistle as the ball first rests on field, 15 forwards or corridori, begin fighting in a wild mixed martial arts match- punching, kicking, tripping, hacking, tackling, and wrestling with each other in an effort designed to tire opponents' defenses, but which often descends into an all-out brawl. They try to pin and force into submission as many players possible. Once there are enough incapacitated players, the other teammates come and swoop up the ball and head to the goal.

    Well, it should be entertaining, at the very least. Just a pity that Dane Coles is retired, he would've loved this.


  • AB Blindside - past, present & future
  • MaussM Mauss

    @reprobate said in AB Blindside - past, present & future:

    In the current team, I guess the assumption is Lomax/Taylor/Williams/Barrett/Vaai/Savea/Sititi + who? They do lack an enforcer. They do lack a lineout target. They also lack a volume ruck-hitter.

    You’re right in what they’re missing isn’t that mysterious. But it does look like those qualities aren’t that commonly found together, at least to me.

    If you’d just ask your six to be a solid lineout operator while hitting plenty of rucks, players like Delany and Ah Kuoi (both AB XV) seem like excellent candidates. But I wouldn’t necessarily see them as enforcers (not to mention the lack of an attacking game). Someone like Papali’i cleans a huge number of rucks but he’s not much of a lineout target (at least, not an experienced one) nor does he make a lot of dominant tackles.

    Do you see any standout candidates who possess these characteristics (enforcer, lineout, rucks)? Every choice does seem like a potentially flawed one, whether it's because of (a lack of) size, work rate or aggression.


  • AB Blindside - past, present & future
  • MaussM Mauss

    @brodean said in AB Blindside - past, present & future:

    There is ingrained habits but your post assumes too much of the players. Macdonald and Foster wanted to play wider games and Akira Ioane obliged. When Vern came along and wanted to keep it close Akira Ioane immediately followed the game pattern and stuck to it all year. So in the case of Akira Ioane I think it shows that clearly they were not ingrained habits.

    Also Fifita when he went back to lock for the Canes played a very tight game and was one of the most physical players in the comp. He was also one of the most physical players in the stodgy NH.

    My point is that I think it's better for coaches to develop the naturally built up game of a player rather than make them conform to preconceived requirements.

    Yes, Akira Ioane was able to develop a tighter style by playing blindside (already starting in 2020, due to him clearly not being wanted as a number 8 by the AB selectors). But what did it actually lead to? Sure, he was a crucial factor in the Blues winning SR. But he made the change for the ABs. And now he's 30 years old, a prime age for a blindside, and he's playing in the second division of Japanese Rugby. Playing as a number 8, by the way. Doesn't seem like an investment with the desired pay off.

    So yes, players can change, according to coaching demands. But I'd argue that it very rarely leads to a player developing to the fullest of his abilities.

    On Fifita, we'll just have to agree to disagree, as we clearly have very different memories of how he played. I'd agree that he's improved with age. I still wouldn't consider him to be the enforcer within the Scarlets' pack, though, I'd give that to Lousi.


  • AB Blindside - past, present & future
  • MaussM Mauss

    @brodean said in AB Blindside - past, present & future:

    Finau is highly effective at attacking rucks and Parker in defensive rucks.

    The only thing I'd add to this comparison is that it matters where those attacking and defensive rucks are cleaned.

    While I do think Finau is a more than adequate cleaner (the occasional sloppy technique notwithstanding), his percentages are aided by the fact that most of his cleaning work is on the edge. Cleans up the middle of the field, where most of the forwards are concentrated, demand more of the cleaner.


  • AB Blindside - past, present & future
  • MaussM Mauss

    @Mr-Fish said in AB Blindside - past, present & future:

    I dunno, it feels like a lot of it just comes down to where you stand on the field. If you're near the breakdown, you're going to be carrying into contact. If you're parked out on the wings, you're going to be running in the open field more. It's very hard to be an 'open' player if you're hitting the ball up in the middle of the field.

    But the question is, how did they end up there, at that particular place on the field? And that does make a big difference. I think there’s three aspects to this: team structure from set-piece, individual decision-making and then, what I’d call, instinctive drift in multi-phase.

    Most players end up in positions where they’re supposed to be from something like lineout or scrum attack. So your six might be tasked with clearing a ruck blindside before folding back to the open. That’s just structure.

    Then there’s recognition of opportunities by the players themselves on the field. Someone like Finau is a good example of this: he’s constantly calling to space, running improvised lines or creating his own ‘pod’ on the fly. He does seem to play with a lot of freedom at the Chiefs, so he ends up in different places, a lot of it seemingly by his own design.

    And finally, as the phases stack up in open play and structure slowly disappears, players are constantly realigning in either attack or defence. And then you see very different patterns with certain players. Some players never move far away from the source, preferring to play close to the ball. Others will naturally drift to the edge, because they’re more comfortable there. That resembles something like instinct.

    So the combination of those three factors – structure, individual decision-making and drift – usually make the difference to me between a player who prefers to play tight and someone who prefers to play wider. Again, that’s just how I see it. I’d also understand if this seems like I’m overthinking things, which wouldn’t be the first time.


  • AB Blindside - past, present & future
  • MaussM Mauss

    @brodean said in AB Blindside - past, present & future:

    Players tend to play as they're asked to by the coaches.

    Well, they'll certainly try. Every player wants, to a certain point, show their coaches that they can deliver what is asked of them.

    But there's also such a thing as ingrained habits. Players have instincts which they've cultivated over years of playing the game. And it becomes exponentially harder to suppress those instincts the higher up the game you go, as the pressure increases and your window to process things becomes smaller and smaller.

    At least, that's how I think of those things. It just makes sense to me. Perhaps you'll go out there and try to play exactly like your coach has told you to. But when there's 50.000 people around you and an angry Afrikaaner is coming at you at a 100 miles an hour, those instincts tend to kick in pretty quickly.


  • AB Blindside - past, present & future
  • MaussM Mauss

    @nostrildamus said in AB Blindside - past, present & future:

    I have to ask, though, isn't there the potential factor that they couldn't replace Kaino because no one was consistent enough (or, potentially, flexible enough?)

    To me, part of the issue, if we’re talking about the situation immediately after Kaino’s departure (late 2017-’19), is that, in the selectors' eyes, they had already identified the perfect replacement in Squire.

    The problem, of course, is that Squire suffered from injuries as well as his own personal struggles. The fact that they selected, in his absence, (1) a player who plays in a completely different manner (Fifita) and (2) a player who was very raw at the time (Frizell), tells me that they never considered that Squire might not make the World Cup.

    So the question – were there no players available? – becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, as they didn't test the players which could've potentially done a job. To me, there were players in Super Rugby at the time – Brad Shields, Taleni Seu, Akira Ioane – who, at least, mirrored certain aspects of Squire’s play more than someone like Fifita did. So the selectors' mistake, to me, is their overconfidence that Squire would come right and their inability to plan for a scenario where he doesn’t make it.

    It’s how you end up in a semi-final of a World Cup with a completely makeshift loose forward trio, which then gets badly outplayed by their opposites.


  • AB Blindside - past, present & future
  • MaussM Mauss

    @canefan said in AB Blindside - past, present & future:

    But I might need to feed it into chat gpt for a summary in 100 words or less...

    Yeah, I went a bit over the top with the word count. I suppose the summary is:

    (1) Poor planning and future-proofing by AB selectors after Kaino
    (2) Too many variables in selectors' demands of the position
    (3) If divided into tight and loose blindside candidates, plenty of options in NZ
    (4) Proper blindside: combination of tight five grunt work and number 8 soft skills
    (5) Interesting option for 2025: Simon Parker.

    That's, I think, the gist of it.


  • AB Blindside - past, present & future
  • MaussM Mauss

    With the recent rumours about Frizell potentially returning to NZ and the persistent questions surrounding the AB blindside position, I thought it would be interesting to take another look at the past, present and future of the 6-jersey.

    Specifically, I’m interested in the selection policies and thought processes, why exactly it’s been so hard for the selectors to find a suitable, long-term replacement for Jerome Kaino, and how current candidates in 2025 would fare in the face of historical selection patterns and requirements. In the end, it boils down to the perennial question: what is a blindside, really?

    There’s a lot to unpack, as you’d expect. Apologies in advance for the rather lengthy post.

    The past: a Kaino-sized hole
    8 July 2017. This was the last Test start for Jerome Kaino in the #6 jersey, against the British and Irish Lions at Eden Park. Since that time, 12 players have worn the jersey across 95 tests over 7 years, with varying degrees of success and duration. This is the list of all the Tests played, the starting 6, opponent, and result.
    5714ee20-19e1-44c9-b7af-ea64d2e83489-image.png
    81a0da15-0986-4025-92b2-b3b822e244af-image.png
    da9d09de-2eb3-475d-aa78-74335fd0bb6b-image.png

    When looking more specifically at some of the cumulative numbers of the different players – number of starts, starting streaks, and win percentages – we get the following table.

    971bccce-04eb-4f82-800d-2ff12ed2201a-image.png

    I’ve highlighted a few things, Frizell, perhaps unsurprisingly, has been the most consistent name on the team sheet, making 26 starting appearances between 2018 and ’23 as the starting six. Behind him figures Akira Ioane, with 15 starts. Ioane had a somewhat consistent spell in the jersey from 2020 onwards, only to be unceremoniously dumped ahead of the 2023 Test season.

    Neither of these two players were ever obvious first-choice selections, with both only ever stringing together 5 consecutive starts. And while rotation is normal – Kaino’s longest starting streak was 9 consecutive Tests across 2 seasons, starting during the 2015 Rugby World Cup and finishing after the 2nd 2016 Test against Wales – both players often lost their place against top tier opposition, something which was much rarer for Kaino from the 2009 season onwards. So the selectors never really settled on a single player, the closest being Frizell during the 2023 Test season, where the selectors seemingly finally backed the Tongan flanker as their main man.

    It certainly didn’t help that the post-Kaino heir apparent, Liam Squire, was unable to put together a consistent streak of performances due to a number of factors, only ever starting 3 Tests consecutively as the AB blindside. And while someone like Vaea Fifita had some intriguing performances around this period, the fact that Fifita was the 2nd-choice behind Squire, despite being such a different type of player, already anticipates some of the muddled thinking of then-AB selectors on what they actually wanted from their six.

    So what could’ve been some of the factors in this inability to produce consistent blindside appearances? Selection policy is certainly partly to blame: players were put into the jersey without seemingly any sort of preconceived or long-term plan in mind. An example of this is someone like Dalton Papali’i being tested out in the position during a crucial Test against Ireland in Dunedin during the 2022 Test series. When the results don’t go as planned, however, the player isn’t seen in the jersey again. So why was he put there in the first place?

    Perhaps the best example of this is the appearances of players in the 6-jersey during crucial World Cup matches who didn’t have any experience of playing there – Barrett against England in the 2019 semi-final, and Vaa’i against France during the 2023 group stages. There seemed to be a too strong belief in the power of tactical surprise and not enough belief in the power of future-proofing from both Hansen and Foster. Faced with obsessive planners during the World Cup – Eddie Jones with England in 2019, Fabien Galthié with France in 2023 – their response seemed to consist solely of the selectorial equivalent of throwing a spanner in the works. Particularly clever, it ain’t.

    Why is it so hard for the ABs to find the right six?
    Another factor surely is not so much the timing of the selections, but the selected player profiles themselves. The first two blindsides selected after Kaino are a good example of this, Squire and Fifita: one is a hard-nosed flanker who excels in the close quarter collisions; the other is at his best out wide, playing and accelerating into space. Fifita’s own interpretation of the blindside’s role – “I like six, because I can use my athleticism to do what I can do on the outside, rather just stay tight and do the hard work, like running into a brick wall and getting your body tired” – is telling in its own right.

    Squire, on the other hand, had a very different view on the requirements of the jersey. Speaking on James Marshall’s What A Lad-podcast, he commented: “I just wanted to run into it as hard as I could... I sort of knew if I could hit someone as hard as I possibly can each time, then I’d most likely win the contact.” It’s hard to imagine more contrasting mindsets as those of Squire and Fifita.

    So why were both selected then? My own guess is that the AB selection criteria for the jersey suffer from a kind of schizophrenia, where the selectors really want two playing profiles for the price of one: on the one hand, they want the player to comply to the Test requirements of a proper blindside – someone who is a physical presence, dominates the collisions, while bringing a more dynamic element to core tight five roles such as cleaning and carrying up the middle. This Test blindside has size, grunt and mongrel, which needs to be used to stop mauls, bring carriers down quickly and to smash breakdowns.

    This, however, isn’t enough for the voracious demands of the AB selectors, adding on game-specific requirements unique to their own game plans: their blindside needs to do all of the above, while also being comfortable as an edge forward, someone who has an offloading game, attacking vision as well as a genuine athletic edge. It’s not hard to imagine the AB selectors looking at Pieter-Steph Du Toit and telling him to work on his handling and attacking support play.

    If this sounds like an unreasonable and overly long list of demands, then you’d be right. To me, one of the foundational reasons for the AB blindside-conundrum is, in other words, self-inflicted, with the requirements of the player simply being too demanding. What is described here are two players, not one. This becomes further obvious if we were to re-classify the previous blindside-suitors into two groups, those of tight and loose blindsides.

    ffd2eb09-39b8-4e48-b672-8762c11f9e34-image.png

    It is important to mention now that this distinction isn’t in any shape or form meant to be normative, meaning that one style is by definition better than the other. Both styles are requirements, not options, within the AB game plan. My classification here is mostly based on what I consider to be the respective player’s foremost strength, the style which fits closest to what the player themselves consider to be their bread and butter.

    Furthermore, I’m also not claiming that these players aren’t able to thrive playing those other styles. Dalton Papali’i has fantastic abilities on the edge, while Ioane can be destructive in the tight. My argument is more that these players, like almost every other player, excel in a particular part and space of the game, be it in the tight or the loose.

    The AB selectors, however, have made no decision on what kind of style they want their blindside to focus on. The six needs to be able to do everything, almost equally well, in their view. This is where the problems start.

    The present: decisions, decisions
    So what does this mean for the present and the upcoming selection of potential AB blindsides? If we were to separate these two styles, as we did above, then the New Zealand rugby landscape offers plenty of potential candidates:

    cfcbca5f-f085-4411-ab62-6e662b829c23-image.png

    This isn’t meant as an exhaustive table of potential blindside-candidates, more a selection of players who clearly fit one of these two specific playing styles. Others who are more difficult to categorize, like Jacobson, an undersized tight six candidate, I’ve left out for now.

    The distinction is pretty clear: the players on the left are typically lock/6s, while the players on the right are equally comfortable at 6 and 8. The players on the left are proficient in the lineout, have high tackle numbers and prefer to spend most of their time in the middle of the field. The players on the right have a more developed attacking identity, able to play in space on the edge, have an offloading game and, importantly, possess rapid acceleration. All of these players can play blindside at Test level. But they are considerably different in their focus, style and areas of specialization.

    The issues start when tight sixes are being asked to do loose six-roles, and vice versa, something which already acts as a predictor of potential issues at Test level within the AB game plan. Take the Round 10 clash between the Chiefs and the Highlanders, for example, which puts a tight six like Oliver Haig opposite a more loose six like Samipeni Finau. Very quickly, the differences between the two become apparent due to the distinctive nature of each of the two halves.

    In the first half, the match was stop-start, a continuous struggle between the two forward packs for territory and possession. The ball went from set-piece to set-piece, from kick to kick, with most of the rugby being played between the 22s as a contest for the ball. This kind of style suits a player like Haig, who likes to play in a supporting role, whether it be in the tackle, carry or clean, alongside the tight forwards.

    Playing tight: Haig likes to stay close to his tight forwards, contesting for possession in the middle of the field

    002f0978-258a-497b-83f2-54f16f3786b0-image.png
    Haig could most often be found in or around the ruck in defence, typically in partnership with either Holland or Lasaqa

    While Haig seemed to enjoy this contest- and forward-focused first half, a player like Finau thrives in the open spaces with the ball in his hand. When the ball barely reaches the edge, however, due to the nature of the breakdown contest in the middle of the field, Finau finds it more difficult to involve himself in the game.

    04bfbc4e-7fe5-41ce-950e-ced5b356b731-image.png

    3b607c0d-a859-4e73-ad6c-a34b1e6e9b74-image.png
    Finau, away from the ball, calling for the ball to come his way but the movement doesn’t reach the end of the chain

    Instead of getting caught up in the forward tussle in the middle of the field, Finau keeps his width, waiting for the ball to eventually come his way. While this width stresses the defence somewhat, it leaves the Chiefs tight five with fewer bodies to contest the breakdown battle.

    Again, it’s not as if Finau doesn’t or isn’t able to effectively clean, with this dynamic clean on Renton preventing a certain turnover.

    Finau clean

    But it’s less of a central facet to his game than it is to Haig: if Brown doesn’t slip, Finau probably continues moving out wide to take up an attacking position rather than execute a dominant clean alongside the Chiefs openside flanker. In contrast to Haig, Finau doesn’t continuously work in pairs, like Jacobson, Brown, Vaa’i and Ah Kuoi do for the Chiefs.

    If Haig felt at ease during the first half forward slog, with Finau struggling to get into the game, the roles would completely reverse in the second, with the game suddenly breaking open for the attack.

    With Finau, you get a player who is incredibly comfortable in open space, who is able to see attacking opportunities unfold before they’ve happened. He also possesses a skillset which is invaluable in unlocking certain attacking movements on the fly. For the Chiefs’ first score after the break, Finau first runs a great, self-spotted line from the lineout, while then calling himself as the spontaneous backdoor passer in the following phase, when the ball shifts back to the open.

    Here, Finau is at his best, acting as a crucial link player between forwards and backs. Ten minutes later, Finau’s persistence on the edge would be rewarded when McKenzie finds him with a well-executed cross-kick.

    Finau try

    The contrast in attacking sensibilities between Haig and Finau is strong. While the latter is like a fish in water in attacking spaces, the former looks more like a deer in headlights. In a rare moment when the ball came to him in attack on the edges, Haig struggled to move away from his natural tendency to play a supporting role and keep his width.

    Early in the first half, for example, with the ball moving out wide with the Highlanders on attack, Haig needed to drift on his opposite, creating space for his inside man while providing the latter with a legitimate passing target. Instead, Haig’s tight instincts immediately kick in, looking to position himself on his inside man’s shoulder as a support and cleaning option.

    Closing the space

    But the unintended effect is that the space becomes shut down as well as the attack, with the Highlanders being saved from being turned over courtesy of an earlier penalty advantage.

    During the second half, with the game breaking up a bit more, Finau started to thrive while Haig struggled to find his feet out wide, the latter being hooked relatively quickly in the half with TK Howden coming on.

    Both Finau and Haig’s issue, in other words, is that they struggle to switch up how they play, making them relatively dependent on the in-game context for them to be effective rather than being able to impact the game no matter the type of contest. And this is where the blindside’s role becomes important. As the player who connects the tight five with the loose forwards, the blindside is a player who needs to be able to take on a multitude of roles and styles: sometimes playing creatively on the attacking edge, and sometimes playing in close support, being closely bound with the tight forwards in collective play.

    More than anything, it’s what the ABs seemingly demand from the position, as someone who can play in the right style, at the right time. This is, however, far easier said than done, and Finau’s and Haig’s contrasting skillsets show why. While both have their own unique strengths, playing as the AB 6, they will be expected to be equally proficient in both the loose and the tight.

    But when this isn’t a skillset which comes particularly naturally to those players, they are on a hiding to nothing. We have seen how players, when faced with the difficult demands of Test rugby and Test coaches, start playing outside of their natural game. It’s easy to imagine how both players would look to overcompensate their own perceived weaknesses in the Test arena – Finau starting to play tighter and more conservative, Haig looking to force himself to stay wide on attack – to detrimental effect.

    Someone like Taniela Tupou is on record as saying how he’s starting to feel like he doesn’t know how to play rugby anymore, after constantly being told to change certain parts of his game. A similar difficulty potentially awaits AB blindsides, as long as the selectors have such ambitious demands of their number six.

    Future: the key(s) to the blindside position
    So what is a blindside, really? From an AB perspective, more than a lineout option, a physical presence, an edge forward, or a collision specialist, the ideal blindside is essentially someone who is equally proficient in tight and loose responsibilities. And, perhaps even more importantly, is someone who has mastered the art of knowing when to play tight and when to play loose, at the right time.

    Wallace Sititi did an admirable job during the 2024 Test season as an interim blindside: his incessant work rate and energy allowed him to be (relatively) effective in both tight and loose situations, showing up all over the field while being a bruising physical presence. But Sititi is about as natural a number 8 as there is: he will carry relentlessly and put his team on the front foot, using both his considerable physical power as well as his skillset to break tackles and gain terrain. He seems destined to end up at the back of the AB scrum.

    So what are the options available to the coaches? What the AB selectors will be looking out for, I think, is a player who falls into one of the two aforementioned categories, but who shows genuine ability in playing the other style as well. And the player who has shown the most improvement in this sense, during the 2025 SR season, has been Simon Parker. Parker has always been a player of promise, a big body who moves well and shows solid technique in the tackle, carry and clean. But what he has shown this season is a new dimension on attack, a willingness to play a central role on attack.

    This moment late in the recent game against Moana Pasifika highlights Parker’s newfound confidence on attack, first throwing the wide pass before running the support line and throwing a beautiful offload for the Ratima try:

    Parker double involvement on attack

    To look at this development a bit more closely, the game against the Crusaders in Round 2 nicely encapsulates the growth of the Kaiwaka flanker’s game. In the first half, Parker was able to display his traditional strength, his work and physicality in the tight exchanges.

    Aggressive cleans, dominant tackles, multiple involvements on both attack and defence through the middle, typically in close cooperation with the tight five

    But what he has improved upon this season is his development of a genuine attacking game, running great lines, being creative in the wider channels and showing a deft array of passing.

    Number 8 skills from Parker: finding gaps and keeping the attack alive

    So someone like Parker will be of great interest to the AB selectors, as he fits the template of an AB blindside, currently. He is able to impact the game, no matter the type of encounter, due to his ability to be efficient in both the tight and the loose. The grunt of a lock and the soft skills of a number 8, this is, in the end, what they are looking for in a blindside flanker.

    For a final note on this already way too long collection of thoughts, it’s relevant to emphasize the importance of coaching in Parker’s development. The Chiefs have been clear about how they want to play during games, taking on the opposition pack in a direct tussle during the first half in order to tire them out, before playing a more expansive game in the second. Parker clearly knows his assignments during each half, making it easier to balance between tight and loose styles of play and to make decisions on attack and defence.

    Herein also lies a key directive for the AB coaches in their search for a new blindside: clarity around game plan and requirements eases the task of the blindside flanker, who already has to juggle different styles and roles across 80 minutes on the field. There are plenty of suitable candidates in NZ to be a quality number 6 at Test level: what is needed is a clear selection policy as well as a straightforward plan, which allows these varied skillsets to shine. Whether it be a tight or a loose blindside, or someone who is able to switch between the two, performance starts with the long-term planning and vision of the AB coaches. And looking at the state of the jersey for the past 7 years, it’s clear they have some work to do.


  • Blues 2025
  • MaussM Mauss

    @Daffy-Jaffy said in Blues 2025:

    sf csi

    lowers sunglasses

    I believe that's... Frazer Brown.


  • WR U20 Championship 2025
  • MaussM Mauss

    @Bovidae said in WR U20 Championship 2025:

    My top XV would be this:

    1 Pole
    2 Oudenryn (it will be Letiu)
    3 Wallace
    4 Vakasiuola
    5 Tengblad
    6 Sa
    7 Mathis
    8 Bason
    9 Pledger
    10 Simpson/Cole
    11 Vaenuku
    12 Wiseman
    13 Cameron
    14 Kunawave
    15 Solomon

    The loose forward and midfield combinations will be hotly contested. I would select Sa as a 6, not a lock.

    My own preferences are pretty similar to this, including Sa as a blindside option.

    One thing I'll say though, after watching way too many defensive sets from the U20 TRC, is that Xavier Treacy and Cooper Roberts put in big defensive shifts during that tournament. I'm not sure you can leave them out. Treacy was also a very reliable lineout option.

    I would probably put Vakasiuola on the bench, to provide impact in the final 20-30 minutes. I'd like to see Cameron have a shot at 12 since I'm just intrigued to see what he can offer there.

    I'm a bit miffed at Tofilau not being selected, I thought he did more than enough to earn his spot. Ahloo, on the other hand, can probably count himself a bit lucky, as I didn't think he had a good tournament. He's still a promising player, so hopefully he has an improved showing in Italy.


  • U20 Rugby Championship 2025
  • MaussM Mauss

    After trying to deduce what the intended defensive shape of the NZ U20s side was in a previous post, here I want to highlight some of the issues experienced by the Baby Blacks during the U20 TRC and what we can reasonably expect from them moving forwards.

    The issues
    Before looking more concretely into the several ‘improvement areas’ of the Baby Blacks’ defensive effort, we can take a look at a chart of the opposition scores. How did they come about, where did they originate?
    c1cd5d93-0fbf-49df-bb3b-4707f48e8b9e-image.png

    An area for immediate improvement becomes apparent when seeing that the NZ U20s conceded 4 maul tries and 3 rather cheap tries off of turnovers: Kunawave’s volleyball spike towards his own try line against the Junior Wallabies, Harvey’s reckless offload in his own 22 against the Pumitas, and Woodley’s backdoor pass which was intercepted by Mlaba in the game against the Junior Boks. A more sturdy maul defence – the openside pillar of the defensive maul was exposed several times, allowing the attacking maul to sheer all too easily towards that space – and better decision-making in the 22 should, at the very least, make the defensive numbers a bit more respectable.

    But there are also some more structural issues, both inherent within the chosen defensive system and ingrained within particular playing habits, which might be more difficult to fix at short notice. These particular things stood out to me.

    (1) Learning the system
    As mentioned above, the defensive shape chosen by the Baby Blacks – narrow defensive line, double tackles, defensive shooters – is not an easy one and requires both a lot of communication as well as defensive nous. The defensive shooter on the wing, for example, can be tasked with shutting down a massive overlap. At several points during the tournament, the outside backs did what was asked of them by shooting up but, once they were in the right space, didn’t really know how to effectively kill the opposition backline movement. This happened multiple times, for example, in the game against the Junior Wallabies:

    In the first instance, Solomon shoots up to kill a two-man overlap but there’s zero pressure on the player with the ball in his hands (Fowler), making it easy for the latter to just throw the long ball over Solomon’s head for the easy walk-in try to Harvey.

    The second example shows much of the same. Kunawave shoots up but, again, there’s no pressure on either the player with the ball in his hands (notice the clever blocking play by Eli Langi) or on the targets for the pass, Kunawave running past them rather than stay with the play. It’s important to say, however, that this isn’t easy at all. Singlehandedly stopping an overlap requires a lot of defensive know-how, which isn’t something that can really be expected of players like Solomon and Kunawave, who are most likely unfamiliar with the such requirements.

    Both examples show that having defensive shooters to ‘spook’ the attack is a collective endeavour: the time and space of the ball carrier needs to be cut down, just as much as the space for the potential receivers needs to be. If a defensive shooter operates alone, there’s very little chance for them to actually be effective. Everyone in the defence needs to be on the same page, if the defensive pressure game is to actually be implemented.

    This is quite an aggressive and complex system to employ, so it will take time to properly embed within the team. It should get better by the time of the World Championship but it’s still a risky system, meant to pressure opposition decision-making while leaving a lot of space available for the opposition attack. Learning the ins and outs of the system is tantamount to becoming a serious defensive outfit.

    (2) Lack of numbers and weak edge defence
    A second issue is closely related to the first and can partly be explained as a systems issue and as something which the players probably still need to get used to. A side effect of the narrow defence and the focus on dominating the collision around the middle areas of the field is that the NZ U20 defence can easily be outflanked. The Baby Blacks do not want to concede the gain-line through their centre so they concentrate their forwards in the middle, trying to put multiple numbers into the collision while wrapping up the opposition carrier, slowing down their ball and trying to turn the contact into an arm wrestle.

    Against the Junior Boks, for example, with the NZ U20s defending inside their own 22, the forwards are all concentrated close to each other, looking to stop the Junior Boks from going through them.

    First Johnston and Bason, then Woodley, Pole and Treacy, bringing down the Junior Bok forwards in double tackles while looking to wrap up the ball in contact. The issue is, however, that the numbers of the stronger defenders quickly run out and with a few more carries one off the ruck from the Junior Boks, Mlaba, the Junior Bok number eight, is suddenly only faced with Cole (10), Wiseman (12) and Kunawave (14) as his opposite defenders. No points for guessing how that ends.

    One of the reasons why the Baby Blacks struggle with numbering up in defence is the double role given to the 9 to perform within this system. Within this passage of play, we see Sinton organizing the defence behind the ruck at the start of the movement.

    c7356bdd-4575-486b-a508-d4b22394c0b3-image.png
    Sinton, behind the ruck, scanning the opposition attack and directing numbers

    But the 9 is also responsible for defending the edge against backline strikes. So when the Junior Bok backs start moving into position and Moyo starts getting involved in organizing the attack, Sinton disappears out wide to shore up the outside defence in anticipation of a midfield strike. At that moment, however, the defensive organisation starts to suffer as well, as there is no one to direct the defensive numbers or point out weaknesses in the defensive line. As a result, mismatches are easily manipulated by the Junior Bok attack, positioning loose forwards to carry against smaller backs.

    It was a similar story for the first Junior Wallaby try, with Pledger first acting as defensive organizer and sweeper behind the defensive ruck:

    fd7488bf-544e-4a6b-9518-9310aada7c8c-image.png

    Before quickly moving to the edge when the Aussie backline started shaping up for a strike.

    13dfa7ee-559e-4de0-963c-0708f72ec840-image.png
    Pledger spots a Junior Wallaby backline shape and swiftly starts moving to the wing

    This is a bit of a bug in the system, as this dual responsibility of the 9 can be exploited by the opposition attack: if they wanted to manipulate the defensive numbers, they can shape their backline for a strike (removing the defensive organizer), while their real intention is to first make the defensive line overfold to the blindside before attacking the open. The NZ U20 forwards, who are mainly concerned with dominating the collision, aren’t paying much attention to numbers, swarming into the contact area. But this makes them susceptible, as we’ve seen throughout the tournament, of losing sight of the bigger picture.

    (3) Defensive connection
    As I’ve mentioned above, in a defensive system which is built on attempting to establish dominance in the collision area, connection and communication are absolutely key. And it is in this aspect where I think the most improvement can and will need to be found, if the NZ U20s are to take the next step in their defensive development.

    There were at least three zones of recurring disconnection, in my view: (a) during the defensive chase, (b) during opposition lineout attack, between the back of the lineout defender and the first defender, and (c) between the pillar defenders at the breakdown and the first defender outside the ruck. While the first issues mentioned above were mainly systems issues, defensive disconnection doesn’t really fall under that, as the first principle of any defence is to connect properly with both your inside and outside man.

    (3a) The defensive chase
    A first form of disconnect which often recurred could be found during different kinds of defensive chases, such as from from kick return or from broken play. It’s clear that players are instructed to quickly close down opposition space, and kick returns and loose balls are ideal opportunities for defensive shooters to tackle opposition players far behind the gain line. But again though, the key is to remain connected to your teammates. A good example of how over-eagerness can lead to poor outcomes can be found with the first Junior Wallaby score, a try to Liam Grover early in the game.

    With the Junior Wallabies hot on attack inside the NZ U20s 22 after some poor discipline, a pass from Hwi Sharples doesn’t find its mark and bounces off of Beau Morrisson, the AU U20 number eight, onto the ground. This is the situation of the defensive line right before the ball becomes loose for the Junior Wallabies:

    f8a3ac2b-a426-4506-8939-aebeebae74cc-image.png

    Seeing the ball hit the floor, Kunawave immediately sprints out of the defensive line to pressure the receiver. While the intention is the right one, there is zero communication with his outsides, as this is the situation just a second or two later.

    bc5af997-12f6-471b-ba20-af2511e60e70-image.png

    Grover, the Junior Wallaby 13, has recovered the ball while Kunawave has over-chased. Simpson, meanwhile has drifted towards the side line while Letiu is still following more than a few metres behind. Where nothing was happening for the Junior Wallaby attack just a second ago, the NZ U20 line has opened like the Red Sea, as a result from an individual defensive chase.

    The effects of a poorly coordinated chase

    Similar examples can be found during opposition kick return, where the NZ U20 chase was aggressive but where the support following in behind was uncoordinated, leading to simple outside breaks for the opposition attack.

    Again, Kunawave chases aggressively but Roberts bites in without any cover on the edge, providing the Pumitas with a potentially dangerous break outside of their own 22.

    (3b) The lineout seam
    Another area of poor connection could be found during opposition lineout attack, where the seam between the tail defender at the back of the lineout (the NZ hooker) and the first defender off the lineout (blindside winger) could be successfully exploited.

    The Baby Blacks used their wingers as first defenders in the backline, with Kunawave and Saunoa tasked to stop hard running ball carriers off first phase in the first game against the Junior Wallabies.

    In their first attacking lineout near the NZ U20s 22, the Junior Wallabies would throw to the back. Their goal was to attack the seam between the NZ hooker and blindside winger, looking for a half-break to set up the attack, after which they can run at a fragmented defensive line.

    Morrisson makes sure to draw Letiu before releasing the ball to Veiru on the unders line

    They would have continued success with this move throughout the first half, exploiting the amount of space behind the lineout formation as well as the inability of Letiu and his wingers to effectively defend this space.

    While this isn’t a particularly easy area to defend, Letiu and his wingers presented a fragile defensive connection as well, neither seemingly on the same page of when and where to defend these incursions. Kunawave and Saunoa were either slow to react or unable to physically make a dominant hit, allowing the Australian U20s easy momentum for set-piece attack. Letiu was also too easily drawn in to the fake maul, drawing him away from this seam and further making the lineout seam vulnerable.

    Part of the issue here is again system-based, the fact that, within the Baby Blacks’ defensive structure, certain backs like Kunawave are asked to do both a lot of defensive work as well as perform different kinds of defensive interventions. There seems to be a relatively clear distribution of attacking and defensive roles – for example, Solomon is one of the key decision-makers in attack while someone like Cooper Roberts seems like the defensive leader – but a utility player like Kunawave is seemingly used like a Swiss army knife. But even then, there’s limits to how much utility value a single player can bring. Realigning some of the defensive responsibilities across the backline might bring more effectiveness in this regard.

    (3c) Disconnection between the pillar defence and first defenders outside
    Every defensive system is going to have its own flaws – for example, the benefit of an extra defender in the line vs. the downside of not having a defensive scanner, as mentioned above – and that comes down to certain preferences and tactical decisions from the coaching group. There’s not a whole lot that can be done about this. What can be changed, however, is certain individual inaccuracies, i.e. simple bad defensive execution.

    While the porousness of the defensive line throughout the U20 TRC can be partly explained by the issues with the multiple defensive roles played by the 9, at the same time, players need to do better to communicate and organize the distance between themselves within the defensive line. Take the following example from the game against the Junior Wallabies.

    f3ad9a0b-5e73-4f13-ace6-441169c38027-image.png

    There’s over 3 metres of space between Bason and Aio Keith, while Bason is slow in closing the space down between himself and the Aussie first five, Fowler. The latter spots the disconnection – too much space between Bason and Keith, Baker is ahead of Bason despite being the secondary defender – and easily exploits this by stepping back inside and attacking the fragile seam between Bason and Baker.

    Baker does well to cling onto Fowler to stop the full linebreak

    Ironically perhaps, this defensive organization improved as the tournament went on, despite conceding 45 points in their final game. The fact that the Junior Boks scored three of their seven tries from 5+ phases shows that they needed to work harder for their scores, at a pace their attack couldn’t sustain for the whole 80. After the early onslaught in the first 30 minutes, the Junior Boks were only able to construct one more score in open play, their other points coming from a maul penalty try and a rather fortuitous if well-executed turnover try.

    Someone like Mosese Bason exemplified this improved defensive effort: after a poor defensive performance against the Junior Wallabies – falling off several standard tackles through poor positioning, footwork and tackle technique – Bason turned in a much more effective performance against the Junior Boks, showing more urgency, accuracy and physicality in defence.

    Prospects for the U20 World Championships
    As the tournament went on, certain improvements were noticeable. As can be expected, the defensive disconnection – which was especially rampant against the Junior Wallabies – became less omnipresent. Also, as players became more accustomed to the system requirements of the NZ U20 defence, system failures became less common, the outside backs more astute in when and where to shoot up, as well as support players becoming more aware of their own tasks during these moments.

    All that being said, it is hard to imagine this side suddenly becoming a defensive powerhouse. There is more than enough will amongst the players – it’s clear there’s no issue with work rate or commitment – but I’m not sure an extra month will be enough time to fix certain tendencies in terms of tackle technique and defensive positioning. The return of players like Oli Mathis, Jayden Sa and Frank Vaenuku – all players with excellent tackle technique, by the way – should definitely help, although the players they’ll most likely replace in the starting lineup – Woodley, Treacy/McLeod and Saunoa – weren’t necessarily the problem to begin with. Perhaps the inclusion of someone like Logan Wallace might make the biggest impact in this regard, as a prop who excels with his work rate around the field. If he can provide a stabile platform in the scrum, then the team as a whole should improve (that's still a big if).

    But again, the strength of this team lies in its ability to accumulate scores in quick succession. If the Baby Blacks can get their defensive connection and communication right, to make the opposition at least work hard for their scores and tire them out, then they should have a reasonable chance at the World Championships in Italy.


  • U20 Rugby Championship 2025
  • MaussM Mauss

    Previously, I have mainly focused on the NZ U20 attack, how it was a mixed bag against the Junior Wallabies before really coming into its own against the Pumitas and the Junior Boks. Here, I’d like to take a look at the Baby Blacks’ defence across the U20 TRC, mainly their defensive shape, what they’re trying to do and, finally, what its main issues were throughout the tournament. And when you’ve conceded an average of 31.6 points across three games, it’s probably fair to say that there were more than a few. It’s also become way longer than I expected so I’m going to split it into two parts, first looking at the shape and how the defence is supposed to look before looking more closely at all the different ways it didn’t reach its desired heights.

    Part 1: The shape
    So what is the defensive set-up of the NZ U20s? When looking at their shape in general phase play, it’s clear that they defend very narrow. A view as seen here, from their game against the Pumitas, can be considered as representative of their typical positioning:

    e8fca5af-4720-4964-9dec-6b71191d6534-image.png

    The Pumitas’ ruck is on the side line and the NZ U20 defensive line covers half of the width of the pitch. Behind them, there are three defensive sweepers: the 9 (Sinton) who covers the space immediately behind the defensive line, the openside winger (Lewai) and the 15 (Solomon). The role of the defensive sweepers is to (1) cover the backfield, (2) lead the scramble defence, and (3) come up when the opposition backline moves into their space.

    So why do the Baby Blacks defend so narrow? This is closely related to one of the two main principles of what I believe their defensive philosophy is, which is dominance of opposition in the collision. The NZ U20s want to smother the opposition attack, through defensive pressure, double tackles and breakdown disruption. They want, in other words, to win the physical battle in the close quarters. A narrow defence helps with this, as it concentrates your strongest defenders within a smaller space, making it easier to defend in groups and swarm multiple defenders into the contact. While this leaves a lot of space out wide, the NZ U20 defence tries to combat this by having multiple, mobile scramble defenders but also and more importantly, by employing defensive shooters, either (1) using the third or fourth defender off the ruck to rush the opposition first or second receiver or (2) using the openside winger to shoot up into the opposition backline, looking to disrupt passing lanes or to take the intercept.

    With this system of defensive shooters, in the first instance, the idea is to target the first or second receiver’s outside shoulder, forcing the latter to either take the contact, halting the attacking momentum, or to force them back to the inside, where the NZ U20s have numbers and are trying to exert dominance. An example of this is Tengblad rushing up, in the game against the Junior Wallabies, where he targets Doyle, not so much to make the tackle necessarily, but rather to force the attack into spaces where the defence wants them:

    Tengblad rushes up, not so much towards the ball carrier but towards his passing lane to the open side

    Another good example can be found in the end stages of the game against the Junior Boks – where the NZ U20s were reduced to 13 so defending in the right areas becomes even more paramount – where Fale rushes up on Hlekani’s outside shoulder, forcing him to come back inside where he’s swallowed up by multiple NZ U20 defenders.

    Fale looking to stop the wide attack before it gets going

    In this first instance, in other words, the defensive shooter is used as a way of guiding the opposition attack back inside and removing the possibility of a wide attack.

    In the second instance, someone like Kunawave is given the responsibility of ‘spooking’ backline movements, entering into the opposition attacking space and hoping that they panic. In the game against the Junior Boks, Kunawave successfully did this, Moyo seeing the space out wide and going for the long pass, only for Kunawave to intercept the ball, the turnover eventually resulting in a try to Harlyn Saunoa on the other side of the pitch.

    In order to further show how this defensive shape is supposed to work in general play, we can look at a specific example of a positive defensive set, from the game against the Pumitas.

    From an Argentina lineout, the NZ U20 defensive line pushes up, with Roberts making the spot tackle behind the gain-line. When the Argentinean player gets the offload away and moves towards the side line, the aggression of the Baby Black defence increases. Harvey and Woodley fly into the breakdown, looking for the counter-ruck, while Cole enters the breakdown when a brief turnover opportunity arises. In the next phase, Woodley and Fale execute the double tackle, with Fale wrapping up man and ball in the upperbody tackle, before ripping the ball away. NZ possession.

    This is what the NZ U20s are looking for: physical dominance in contact, breakdown disruption and swarming the opposition. In their next defensive set against the Pumitas, the Baby Blacks would further up their aggression in their midfield defence and gain even better results.

    Harvey makes a great spot tackle, with Roberts and Maisiri both following up well in order to increase the pressure on the attack

    Harvey, Roberts and Maisiri are all in sync with what they’re trying to do and it leads to a turnover try. But this immediately brings us to the second pillar of this defensive philosophy, which is communication and connection. Whenever you leave a lot of space out wide in favour of a defensively aggressive system, it forces your players to be in constant communication: who goes into the breakdown? Who goes high and who goes low when making the double tackle? Who guards the space I’ve left when I’m making the defensive read? Who covers the backfield when I push up into the defensive line as a sweeper? All of these questions need to be answered constantly, all the while when you’re making tackles and moving bodies.

    It is in this breakdown of communication and defensive connection where most of the issues still reside within the NZ U20 defence. This I’ll further explore in the second part of this short series on the Baby Blacks’ defence.

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