The Silver Fern

@mariner4life said in All Blacks v France:

That word "detail".comes up a lot

My impression is we still play rugby on vibes rather than details

I do think that's true when it comes to detail around stuff like timing, running lines, and skill execution. There's too many players who are missing their cues, resulting in handling errors and breakdown turnovers.

Robertson likes to call these "missed opportunities" but it's up to the coaches to sort that out.

@bayimports said in All Blacks v France:

For me, while I agree I also think if Jordan was more aware he gets into a better position to take that ball flatter (at pace), hence it doesn't have to be thrown so deep and easier for him to beat cover defence. He should have scored if he was good enough in my opinion

Yeah, he seemed to be a little hesitant to fully commit to the attack. It's like he was watching whether the secondary arrow would work rather than just focussing on his own task.

It's something that reappears quite a lot when looking at AB lineout strikes across the Test season. Just that little lack of detail. In this particular move as well, Ratima is taking Lakai's pass standing still. While the whole point of the strike move is to have the entire backline in movement, so the defence has to take the threat of the running 9 into account as well. That wasn't the case here. It makes it just that little bit easier to defend.

@Kruse I’m not sure if I’m quite so in control with my responses to things. When watching the game on Saturday, I was curious about the ABs’ use of their lineouts. Next thing you know, I’m watching Hurricanes lineouts from 2022 and looking up how to link timestamps on YouTube videos.

@Kruse To be fair to kiwiinmelb, that's pretty much the gist of it. And you could ask yourself, why write 2,443 words when 47 could suffice?

Then again, I'm personally more of a quantity-over-quality kinda guy.

When Jason Holland was confirmed as backs coach at the end of 2023, I wasn’t quite as disheartened as many seemingly were on this forum, a feeling especially common amongst Hurricanes fans. While Holland had his considerable limits as head coach and selector at the capital-based franchise, there was one facet in which he and his Hurricanes teams excelled in, and that was set piece-attack. All things considered, that was pretty much the exact reason he was brought in for, as first Leon Macdonald and then Scott Hansen would take care of the broader principles of the attack. When Will Jordan was asked about his try against England ahead of the Dublin test, he was quick to redirect the plaudits to his backs coach for meticulously planning out the strike move: “It was good to connect with Beaudy and he put a great ball back to the inside, so. But the credit must go to Jase Holland who organizes our lineout strikes. [He] spotted an opportunity there and it paid dividends.”

So when France infringed in the 74th minute of Saturday’s Test match, the stage was set for a Hurricane strike move to finish the job. And yet, Scott Barrett went for three rather than a lineout attack, seemingly signalling a distrust in the efficacy of the strike moves. So what exactly has happened? In order to understand this moment a bit better, I’ve taken a look back at the Hurricanes’ set-piece attack under Holland, why it didn’t make an appearance at the end of the game against France and some of its teething issues in Test rugby.

The Hurricane lineout attack
Holland’s lineout attack at the Hurricanes was characterized by its simplicity, its efficacy and its potential for small but successful variations. Its most effective shape was marked by its use of a six-man lineout with a plus one in the boot, who functioned as the in-field passer to a running 9. The core principle of this move was to have multiple runners in motion, organized around an “arrow runner” (not quite sure what to name this, but arrow seemed appropriate) in midfield, with passing options off both shoulders as well as a further one (typically, the first five) out the back.

A good example of both this signature strike move as well as a slight variation to it can be found in the Hurricanes match against the Rebels in Wellington, in Round 14 of Super Rugby Pacific 2022.

Highlight with timestamp

Early in the game, the Canes have a lineout just outside the Rebels 22. They call a six-man lineout formation, set-up to maul, with Kirifi as plus one. O’Reilly throws to Gibson at the front who quickly transfers to Kirifi, who passes to a running TJ Perenara. Perenara throws a cut-out pass to Proctor in the midfield (the arrow runner), with Love running a hard inside cut while Morgan loops around. Proctor throws the backdoor to Morgan after the Rebels’ midfield has bitten in on Love, creating a two-on-one, leaving Julian Savea with only one man to beat.

Vaihu has bitten in on Love, leaving Morgan free to create the overlap

Seven minutes later, the Canes have another lineout, this time just inside the Rebels 22.

The Canes set up in the same formation and you can see how the Rebels midfield defender, Kellaway, identifies this. This time, he aims to shut down the overlap by targeting the out the back option (Morgan). The only problem is that the Hurricanes have gone for one of their slight variations: Perenara holds the ball a fraction longer, Proctor, the arrow runner, drifts to Kellaway’s inside shoulder and when the 9 passes, a gap has already been created through the Rebels’ midfield’s anticipation of the back-door option. They have taken their eyes off the arrow runner as a potential carrier, leaving the latter to simply run through the space and score the try. Simple but effective.

A visibly dejected Kellaway, after being burned again by the strike play

The six+1 lineout strike made regular appearances in the Hurricanes’ highlight reels across the Holland seasons. I’m sure it greatly enhanced Holland’s reputation as a set-piece specialist. It is also understandable how a portfolio like Holland’s would be attractive to someone like Scott Robertson. While Robertson is a firm believer in defence, counter-attack and set-piece pressure, set-piece attack, especially the lineout peel in the opposition 22, was a staple of the Crusaders during Razor’s tenure. It typically acted as a kind of secondary source of scoring income, an added platform for opposition pressure rather than the core game plan. The in-play superiority of the team would set the team up for victory, and the set-piece attack could act as the killer blow. While Hansen is Razor’s trusted companion, Holland seemed to be appointed to be his sword. So why was it so blunt against France?

Lineout attack at the Stade de France
At first, it seemed as if the Hurricane lineout strike would not get to make an appearance in the test match. Instead of the typical six-man lineout set-up, with the +1 in the boot to act as the in-field passer, the ABs went for five-man lineouts, with Roigard at the base to throw the in-field pass to Barrett at first receiver. Rather than set-up for any sort of immediate strike, the goal seemingly was to secure possession and settle into phase-play, with several passages of play after an NZ lineout going to 7+ phases. While these lineout attacks weren’t necessarily unsuccessful – apart from the botched Savea to Ioane transfer in midfield and the breakdown penalty – it ultimately resulted in very little on the scoreboard, New Zealand’s tries coming from good counter-attack on kick return and a forced turnover around the French 22.

It was only in the 52nd minute, after France had just scored two quick tries in succession, that the call came for a six-man lineout, with Lakai in the boot. It was a field position typical for the Hurricane lineout strike, in and around the opposition 22, with the likely goal being to create a scenario where Caleb Clarke is put into space and in a one-on-one situation close to the try line.

The French, however, quickly identified what was coming: Roumat immediately spots the pattern, runs to the middle while calling lifters to him and promptly steals the ball.

Roumat calling lifters to him after seeing what’s about to happen

The ABs would get another shot at it in the 59th minute, after a breakdown penalty won by Savea. With the gap at seven points, this is the perfect moment to pull out a strike with a high-success rate. The lineout set-up is the same, 6+1, only this time the call is to go to the front. Savea secures the ball and transfers quickly to Lakai, who throws the pass to Ratima. The 9 passes long to ALB who acts in this scenario as the arrow runner. In an interesting variation to the play – which catches the French midfield defence off guard – Lienert-Brown quickly passes to Ioane, who, instead of acting as the dummy inside cut, functions as a sort of secondary arrow, with McKenzie on his shoulder and Barrett as a back-door option.

In the standard play, ALB would take up the ball, with Ioane as the dummy runner. Instead, ALB passes to Ioane, creating a secondary arrow.

The variation works, as Ramos is caught in no man’s land, allowing Ioane to put McKenzie into space who still has Jordan on the outside.

Bielle-Biarrey seems fixed but isn’t.

The only thing that saves France is Bielle-Biarrey’s ability to act as two defenders at the same time. First, he is in position to make a tackle-assist on McKenzie but as soon as the latter passes to Jordan, he uses his incredible pace to shut down the space in the corner. Jordan is unable to finish against the French scramble defence and the AB trump card, the Hurricane lineout strike, is successfully foiled.

This is, at least, one good reason why Barrett didn’t go for the corner at the end of the game, as one of the signature strike moves of Holland had been earmarked and recognized by the French defence, both at the lineout (Roumat) and in the scramble (Bielle-Biarrey). If your opposition already knows what is coming, your chances of success drop drastically. Even when the ABs used an unexpected variation to the strike with the secondary arrow, the French defence was still able to adjust quickly.

AB lineout attack in 2024: a mixed bag
Another potential reason for Barrett’s choice is that the NZ set-piece attack has had a season with very mixed results. There were some great tries scored off lineout (SA 1, ENG) and scrum (JP), but other promising movements often fell short through lack of execution. There were also quite a few signs that what worked well in Super Rugby didn’t translate so well to test rugby, including the signature Hurricanes lineout strike.

The second game against the Springboks in Cape Town offers some nice examples of this difficult transition, in my view. After creating a lot of opportunities but just coming up short in Joburg, the ABs, once again, were able to produce plenty of line-breaks off lineout attack in Cape Town. In the 13th minute, for example, the ABs have a lineout near the Springbok 22:

Cane breaks off of his position as plus one and Taylor throws it over the top. After a relatively quick recycle, Sititi makes a powerful midfield carry. The Springbok defence is struggling to keep the pace with the AB attack and in the next phase, Ratima passes to Savea who, targeted by both De Allende and Du Toit, passes back inside to Taylor who makes the line-break, as Wiese is too late in taking up his spot on Pieter-Steph’s inside. While this is a nice lineout strike, at the same time, this is the situation immediately after the line-break:

The Springbok defence is more alert to the break than the ABs. Scott Barrett is watching it all unfold and Sititi is only just getting off the floor. While Tamaiti Williams has nicely anticipated the situation, Ratima is the only realistic option to finish the break. Seeing this, Wiese follows the script from the RWC final (run every single support runner off their line, at whatever cost) and clumsily trips up the AB 9, costing himself a trip to the sinbin.

This simple fact – that Test defences react much, much quicker to breaks than Super Rugby defences – has been the single biggest Achilles heel of the 2024 AB lineout attack, as it has been unable to fully anticipate this fact into its strikes. One final example to show this, and where else to finish than with the Hurricane lineout strike.

In the 56th minute, with the ABs trailing the Springboks 13 points to 9, New Zealand has a lineout within the Springbok 22.

The six-man plus one formation is called and, after Barrett secures the ball at the front, Cane acts as the in-field passer to Perenara at 9. Perenara throws a long pass to the arrow runner, ALB, with Jordan running the dummy cut. Lienert-Brown passes out the back to McKenzie, who has Ioane on his shoulder and Reece out wide. McKenzie passes short to Ioane to bypass Kolbe, allowing Rieko to release Reece towards the corner.

Besides the addition of Ioane – which is necessary because of the throw to the front as well as the presence of the Springbok defensive shooter (Kolbe) – this is a mirror image of the typical Hurricane lineout strike. As a result, we can compare some stills side-by-side (I have taken a Hurricanes lineout strike from their game against the Fijian Drua in 2023:

First, the situation of the arrow runner when he is close to the line.

What is noticeable is how different the space off of the arrow runner’s shoulder is in both situations: whereas in the Canes example Moorby is still a solid option for the pop-pass by Sullivan, forcing the Drua edge defender to turn inside, against the Springboks, Am has beaten Jordan into this space. The Jordan dummy run then has no effect on the Springbok scramble to the outside, as they can fully focus on the backdoor options and collectively push to the outside.

This is the end result of both strikes. Whereas the Fijian Drua defence is comprehensively outflanked by the play, leaving Goosen a simple run-in try, the Springbok defence, on the other hand, has outpaced the AB attack to the corner, leaving Reece face-to-face with four Springbok defenders on their feet. A few aspects have led to this situation: the throw to the front rather than the middle, which means that there is more space to make up; the necessity of McKenzie being a metre further back in order to be able to execute the overlap with Ioane against the Springbok shooting defender (Kolbe); and Jordan being beaten to the space, leaving the scramble defence free to sprint to the outside. These are matters of inches and seconds, but, as it turns out, that is the difference between scoring and getting turned over, between winning and losing.

Returning to the 74th minute in Paris
We will never know what was really going on in Scott Barrett’s head when he pointed to the sticks near the end of the Test match against France. Perhaps he felt they were on the right side of the referee and could eke out a win through Razor’s principles of in-game superiority: defensive intensity, set-piece superiority and dynamic counter-attack phase-play, forcing a penalty in the dying minutes. What we do know, is that he didn’t feel comfortable going to the Hurricane lineout strike as a means of guaranteed points. After being foiled in Cape Town, the French defence had shown itself more than capable of dealing with it as well, both at the lineout and through the scramble, even in the face of clever innovations. If the Hurricane lineout strike is going to return to Test rugby in 2025, Jason Holland will need to find a way of sharpening it, where it can finally cut through South African and French Test defences. If he can, we can expect some of these results to reverse in the next Test season. If he doesn't, Barrett will have to keep going for 3, hoping that this time they can secure an opportunity for the winning kick.

@MiketheSnow I'm not writing him off at all. All I'm saying is that, at the moment, Tele'a is a better 14 and McKenzie is a better 15. I don't think those are particularly unfair calls. If there were more depth at first five, I think McKenzie would've been given more time at fullback.

I also think Jordan is more than capable of stepping up. He just needs to start cutting those errors out of his game.

I can’t say I’ve been a fan of Jordan on the wing. Right wings typically have to make do with limited space, so a quick step (NMS), fend (Jane) or deceptive strength in contact (Tele’a) are crucial. Tele’a’s performance against England for me represents what you really want from your 14. Getting the most out of very little.

I’d argue that Jordan possesses none of those typical right wing-traits. When playing on the wing with limited space, he tends to get physically bullied by his opposition winger (I have bad memories of Kolbe manhandling him in the RWC final).

His strengths seem to me to be his ability to scan defences and to produce an acceleration through the gap. While this is less visible and I can’t really provide any evidence of this, he does strike me as a good communicator. At the very least, he is talking a lot throughout games.

So, personally, I’d want him to improve as a fullback (and like many have said here, he has a lot to improve on). If he doesn’t, he probably falls outside of the 23 for me.

@DaGrubster said in All Blacks v France:

They don’t really have a bigger pack to select.

Perhaps bigger is not the right word. Players who thrive more in the tight spaces, something like that? Against France, NZ tried to keep the ball tight and go through the middle in the French 22 but the pick and go was very messy. Cleaners were often unable to keep their feet at the ruck and carriers didn't dominate contact, leading to a lack of forward momentum and French turnover ball.

Ireland’s win against South Africa in Durban came after selecting Beirne at six and playing more directly. They then tried a similar line-up against NZ (without playing as direct) and it didn’t work. I don’t want to simplify things too much, but with how close the top teams are (with Argentina and Australia on the rise), I’d think a horses for courses-approach might be best. In this approach, you’d have something like a "Crusader" gameplan for certain opponents (Ireland, England, Australia, Argentina) while taking on a Cotter/Schmidt/Blues-style for others like South Africa and France. The latter means more aggressive ruck defence, lots of blindside switches in attack, and picking players who excel in the pick and go and are able to dominate contact in close (Tu’ungafasi, Sotutu, Savea, Taukei’aho, Tuipulotu, etc.).

I don’t think it’s particularly likely that Robertson is going to go for something like this, but he can’t keep losing to teams with this playing style without coming onto serious pressure. I also don’t think this is unique to Robertson. Anyone who has been watching NZ U20s rugby for the past 12 years will probably have noticed how much these teams struggle with forward packs who stay tight together and flood the breakdown on attack and defence (some examples: SA 2012, ’14, ’19; FR 2018, ’23, ’24; WL 2012, ’19; IRL 2016; AU 2019, ’23). Those are a lot of coaches – Penney, Boyd, Robertson, Philpott, Laidlaw, Gibbes – who haven’t been able to successfully tackle this issue.

Robertson is a big believer in cohesion so that would go against this sort of mixed approach. I guess we’ll find out in the coming years whether cohesion is enough to overcome this close quarter forward-style.

@Billy-Tell said in All Blacks v France:

The ref was fine. Let’s not become Irish.

My comment on Amashukeli wasn’t intended as a slight against him. I also think it’s possible to talk about refereeing without it turning into ref bashing.

A ref’s interpretation of the breakdown is always important but I feel like it gains more weight when you have two opposing teams with very different playing philosophies, like New Zealand and France have. Whereas the French forward pack generally plays like a tight, cohesive unit (where they are always within a 20 metre radius of each other), the ABs like to keep width and have forwards and backs dispersed across a backline.

That also means that the tackle area becomes very important for a side like the All Blacks, as they try to limit the number of players committed to securing the ruck. When the tackle area is a mess, and you have, for example, only Will Jordan and Sevu Reece available to clean out in a ten metre radius, then it’s easy to see how that quickly turns into a problem.

That being said, there’s certainly a case to be made that the current game plan isn’t working when facing sides like France and the Springboks. In all three tests, New Zealand lost the game through their inability to win the breakdown, both on attack and defence, with France and South Africa finding it too easy to generate scores through the pick and go when within the NZ 22. In all three tests, Robertson’s solution – of running them off their feet by keeping the ball – hasn’t worked. And you’d have to wonder whether he should radically alter his approach to these teams, for example, by picking a bigger pack and by tightening the game plan.

The current game plan can still work, I think, but then you have to have a number of strike moves off of lineout and scrum which almost guarantee points (similar to how France had that maul try with the early shift up their sleeve). Currently, the ABs are getting too little purchase of those attacks for them to win these test matches.

So again, definitely not intending to bash the ref. Simply trying to get some more insight on what went wrong against France.

I'm watching the game again and in the 16th minute, with New Zealand on the attack in the French 22, Amashukeli penalizes Savea for going off his feet in the clean. The only problem is that Savea was only off his feet because Mauvaka trips him up when rolling away.

The protocol has been pretty clear for quite a while now: first you look at the actions of the tackler before you take the breakdown contest into account. Amashukeli consistently ignored the actions of the tacklers throughout the game, which I think better suited the French breakdown tactics than it did the ABs'.

I don't think it necessarily lost New Zealand the game but it's more than a bit confusing when you have such different approaches from a ref on a week-to-week basis.

@Bones Yeah, he's been anonymous two weeks in a row. A lot of the Irish forwards seem very flat.

Irish attack against 14 not going anywhere. Great defence by Argentina but not a lot of invention by Ireland.

The Irish are in a weird place when they're pinning their hopes on a young guy like Prendergast. Then again, Crowley's confidence, compared to the Six Nations, has fallen off a cliff.

@cgrant I once read an article on him - I think it was by Logan Savory, the journo who covers the Southland Stags. He grew up in Australia, moved to Samoa where he took up rugby and then came to New Zealand for a rugby opportunity.

Played for the Highlanders U20s, Southland Stags and turned out for the Taranaki Bulls this year. He's a 6/8, good athlete and solid ball carrier. He's had a few injuries which I think hampered his development somewhat, but if he could further round out his game, I think he could be a handy player.

Edit, found the article:

There's a 6/2 split on the bench, but there's pretty good cover. Something happens to Ramos, Dupont probably shifts one out with Le Garrec coming in. If Buros gets injured, Bielle-Biarrey goes to fullback and Gailleton comes onto the wing.

Gailleton can genuinely cover both wings and both midfield positions, so he's a handy player to have in that 23 jersey.

The biggest risk is probably at 10. Dupont can play there to a reasonable enough level, but he's a lot better at 9.

French team's been named.

No Penaud, who is still sick. Ramos at 10. Buros, the Bordeaux fullback, at the back. Tatafu starting at tighthead, with only his second cap.

Pretty much the team predicted earlier in the week.

@Bovidae This is from an article on WalesOnline (I'll just give the Gatland-quote because the website is genuinely unreadable):

"I'm sure he'll be really disappointed. We see him as an outstanding player for the future."

"Probably for him [Plumtree], the message is we know he's going to be good. There were probably a few errors around his game last week that need to be tidied up. And Jim Botham gets that opportunity. He's trained exceptionally well and we think that's the right mix for this weekend."

So he's been dropped.

@nostrildamus said in All Blacks vs Ireland:

I was reading his article, thinking, am I actually agreeing with it / him for once?!

The bit about Ioane being forbidden to run at training was interesting. Bit extreme from the coaches but Rieko seems to have responded well to it. It's good to see that the noise around him is starting to shift in a more positive direction.

@reprobate said in All Blacks vs Ireland:

Some good defensive disruption from our guys for sure, but I don't think we'd want to be patting ourselves on the back too much

I'd certainly agree with that. When looking back at the Argentina game, it's honestly surprising they didn't concede more points. In the Ireland test, I'd say the AB defence was simply good enough to give themselves a shot at winning. It wasn't perfect by any means. Steps in the right direction, though!

@nostrildamus Shit, that's never a good sign.